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Abstract 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the construct validity of a measure of 
trait reactance: the Hong Psychological Reactance Scale (HPRS). Investigating the 
functioning of this measure was particularly important, as the conclusions drawn from 
studies relating reactance to affect, attitudes, and behavior hinge on the legitimacy and 
quality of the HPRS. Using two samples of undergraduates, the current study employed 
structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine the factor structure of the HPRS and 
relate it to conformity, the Big Five personality traits, and entitlement. Results supported 
modeling the HPRS via a modified incomplete bifactor model. As expected, trait 
reactance was negatively related to conformity, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, 
and positively related to entitlement. Implications for using and scoring the HPRS are 
discussed.   
 
 
  
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction  
Psychological Reactance Theory 
According to Psychological Reactance Theory (PRT), people perceive that they 
have various behaviors, thoughts, and feelings they can engage in at a given time; PRT 
calls these behavioral freedoms (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  When one or 
several of these behavioral freedoms are threatened with elimination or are actually 
eliminated, PRT argues that people will experience a motivational state aimed at 
protecting the threatened freedom(s) (Brehm; Brehm & Brehm). The motivation to re-
establish a behavioral freedom has been termed psychological reactance. Reactance is 
typically an unpleasant experience for people and can result in anger, aggression, and 
hostility. In response to experiencing reactance, people may try to restore their freedom 
by either (1) directly engaging in the behavior (i.e., direct re-establishment) or (2) by 
enacting other similar freedoms (i.e., indirect re-establishment). 
Consider, for example, Prohibition in the United States. From 1919 to 1933, it 
was illegal to produce, transport, or sell alcoholic beverages. The ban appeared to be 
effective at first, as evidenced by a decrease in liquor consumption and fewer arrests 
related to public drunkenness. However, these data did not appear to “reflect the growing 
disobedience toward the law and law enforcement…[That is,] the illegal production and 
distribution of liquor, or bootlegging, became rampant” (U.S. National Archives and 
Record Administration, 2009). This illegal behavior illustrates an example of 
psychological reactance. That is, numerous Americans likely experienced psychological 
reactance during Prohibition, which motivated them to restore their behavioral freedom to 
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drink alcohol. To do this, many Americans engaged in direct re-establishment by 
consuming alcoholic beverages that were illegally produced and distributed.  
Why Study Psychological Reactance? 
Originally, PRT defined reactance as a context-specific occurrence (i.e., state 
reactance), however theorists have expanded the theory, positing that individuals may 
also vary in their disposition to experience reactance independent of the context (e.g., 
Dowd, Milne, & Wise, 1991). In other words, researchers have theorized that people vary 
in how reactant they are in general. As such, researchers have developed measures of 
trait reactance to better understand the characteristics and actions of employees (Sachau, 
Houlihan, & Gilbertson, 1999), therapy clients (e.g., Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993), and 
college students (Johnson & Buboltz, 2000). For example, organizational settings that 
place a great deal of importance on compliance (e.g., the military or law enforcement) 
could use a measure of trait reactance for personnel selection. A measure of trait 
reactance could also be very useful in a university setting, where students are expected to 
adhere to the expectations and requests of faculty and administrators. Students who tend 
to experience reactance in response to being told what to do may be at risk for 
unfavorable outcomes (e.g., dropping out of school). Moreover, trait reactance has been 
positively associated with trait anger (Hong & Giannakopoulos, 1993; Hong & Faedda, 
1996), aggression (Dowd & Wallbrown), and loneliness (Joubert, 1990), and negatively 
related to happiness (Joubert) and conformity (Goldsmith, Clark, & Lafferty, 2005). In 
addition, several researchers have examined the personality profiles of people high in 
trait reactance (Buboltz, Woller, & Pepper, 1999; Dowd & Wallbrown; Dowd, 
Wallbrown, Sanders & Yesenosky, 1994). Clearly, measuring the trait reactance of 
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individuals may provide insight into important quality of life variables (e.g., trait anger, 
loneliness, happiness), as well as the personality traits and attitudes (e.g., conformity) that 
influence the behavior of individuals. 
Given the extensive study of reactance in relation to numerous affective, 
attitudinal, and behavioral variables, there is clearly an interest in using reactance to 
better understand individuals. In order to make accurate conclusions and inferences, 
however, researchers need a quality measure of trait reactance. A quality measure is 
developed by gathering and evaluating validity evidence.    
A framework proposed by Benson (1998) is especially useful in evaluating the 
validity (i.e., quality) of the inferences made from test scores. Benson emphasizes the 
importance of theory and outlines three stages that must be undertaken in developing a 
measure with high construct validity: a substantive stage, a structural stage, and an 
external stage. In the substantive stage, the construct is defined both theoretically and 
empirically. Items must be written to represent the various aspects of the construct so that 
there is a clear link between the theory underlying the construct and the items used to 
represent it. During the structural stage, inter-item relationships are assessed and the 
observed dimensionality of the scale is compared to the theorized dimensionality. In 
other words, if items are functioning adequately, they should relate to one another in 
theoretically expected ways. Assessing the structure of the observed scores is also useful 
as it indicates how the measure should be scored. For example, if item scores were found 
to be unidimensional, then computing a total score would align with the dimensionality. 
In contrast, if item scores were multidimensional, then computing subscale scores to 
reflect each dimension would be more acceptable than computing a total score. During 
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the external stage, scale scores are related to measures of other theoretically related 
constructs. It is through the external stage that test scores become meaningful.  
The Current State of Measurement of Trait Reactance 
 Although several measures of trait reactance have been developed (Merz, 1983, as 
cited in Tucker & Byers, 1987; Dowd et al., 1991), the Hong Psychological Reactance 
Scale (HPRS) appears to be the most suitable measure to study a wide range of 
populations. Compared to other measures of trait reactance, the HPRS has been studied 
the most with respect to its psychometric properties, and has been used by numerous 
substantive researchers. Using Benson’s (1998) construct validation process as a 
framework, the HPRS is evaluated below. The alternative measures will be reviewed and 
evaluated in Chapter 2. 
Substantive Stage 
 Hong and Page (1989) developed the HPRS to address the limitations associated 
with the first developed measure of trait reactance: the 18-item Questionnaire for the 
Measurement of Psychological Reactance (QMPR, Merz, 1983, as cited in Tucker & 
Byers, 1987). To develop the HPRS, Hong coordinated a group of social psychology 
students to revise the items from the QMPR. The wording, clarity, and relevance of each 
item were assessed, and “modified accordingly” (Hong & Page, p. 1324). In addition, 
new items were written, resulting in an initial pool of 60 items. These items were 
subsequently evaluated according to their relevance to reactance in general. Of the 60 
items, 15 were selected and presented to nine behavioral scientists for further evaluation. 
One additional item was removed due to redundancy, and six were reworked to improve 
readability, resulting in the 14-item HPRS (see Appendix A).  
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 There are several concerns regarding the substantive stage of the HPRS. 
Specifically, in addition to revising the 18 items from the QMPR, 42 new items were 
written. However, why and how these new items were created was not explained. For 
example, it is unclear whether the new items were written to address Hong and Ostini’s 
(1989) concern that trait reactance was under-represented by the revised QMPR items. 
Moreover, Hong and Page (1989) did not articulate whether items were written to 
represent specific dimensions of reactance. This lack of detail regarding item creation 
could be due to the fact that the theoretical structure of trait reactance has never been 
explicitly stated in the literature. Thus, it is possible that the researchers, unsure about the 
dimensionality of the HPRS, planned to rely on empirical studies of the structure of the 
HPRS to inform the dimensionality of trait reactance.  
Structural Stage 
 To date, the factor structure and reliability of the HPRS have been examined via 
six studies. Upon evaluating these studies, however, the need for additional study of the 
scale’s dimensionality becomes apparent. In the first psychometric study of the scale, 
Hong and Page (1989) administered the HPRS to 257 Australian undergraduates and 
studied the structure of the HPRS using a principle components analysis (PCA) with 
orthogonal rotation. Four components emerged, which the researchers labeled: Freedom 
of Choice, Conformity Reactance, Behavioral Freedom, and Reactance to Advice and 
Recommendations (see Table 1). Although Hong and Page did not explicitly define these 
components, an inspection of the items reveals that Freedom from Choice appears to 
represent negative attitudes toward restrictions placed on choices or decisions. 
Conformity Reactance appears to reflect a disposition to resist rules and regulations. 
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Behavioral Freedom appears to reflect resistance toward being influenced by others. 
Reactance to Advice and Recommendations appears to represent oppositional attitudes 
toward the advice and recommendations offered by other people. It is important to keep 
in mind, however, that the researchers did not articulate whether the items were written to 
represent these (or other) dimensions of trait reactance. Estimates of internal consistency 
(! = .77 and " = .82) and test-retest reliability (r = .89) were reported for the total score. 
Curiously, they did not report the reliabilities of the subscales defined by the four 
components, despite championing four orthogonal components of reactance. 
Consequently, it is unclear whether Hong and Page advocated using four subscales, as the 
PCA would support, or a total score, which aligns with their computation of reliability. 
In the second psychometric study of the HPRS, Hong (1992) administered the 
scale to a different population: 462 non-student participants from the general public in 
Australia. Hong replicated the analytic procedure used by Hong and Page (1989; PCA 
with orthogonal rotation). Again, a four-component solution was interpreted. 
Interestingly, the same labels used by Hong and Page were applied to the components, 
despite three items “loading” on different components (see Table 1). Again, estimates of 
internal consistency (! = .81) and test-retest reliability (r = .76) were only reported for 
the total score. 
 Hong and Faedda (1996) conducted the third psychometric study of the HPRS, 
administering the scale to a large sample of respondents in Australia (1,423 university 
students and 1,660 participants from the general public). As in their previous studies, they 
used PCA with varimax rotation and four components emerged. However, some items 
represented different components across studies (see Table 1). Consequently, Hong and 
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Faedda modified the names of the four components to reflect the changes in structure: 
Emotional Response Toward Restricted Choice (the tendency to experience reactance in 
response to other people interfering in one’s choices or decisions), Reactance to 
Compliance (the tendency to experience reactance in response to others’ desires or 
expectations), Resisting Influence from Others (the tendency to experience reactance in 
response to others’ attempts to influence one’s behavior), and Reactance Toward Advice 
and Recommendations (the tendency to experience reactance in response to advice and 
suggestions offered by other people). In addition, Hong and Faedda (1996) stated that 
three items (4, 10, and 14) complicated the interpretation of the factor structure because 
they had either relatively low communalities or represented more than one component. 
These items were removed, forming an 11-item version of the HPRS. Using the same 
sample, Hong and Faedda conducted a PCA with varimax rotation to examine the 
structure of the 11 items. As expected, a four-component structure with no cross loadings 
emerged, paralleling the four components found for the 14 items (see Table 1). Similar to 
previous studies, estimates of reliability (!) were only reported for the 14- and 11-item 
total scores, which were .80 and .77, respectively. Hong and Faedda recommended using 
the 11-item version of the HPRS. 
Before discussing subsequent studies of the structure of the HPRS, several 
limitations of the studies conducted by Hong and colleagues should be noted. First, PCA 
was used in all of the studies. Although PCA is an exploratory analytic technique, it does 
not explicitly differentiate common variance from error variance. That is, the components 
are created from the total variance of the items. Thus, PCA does not account for 
measurement error, which leads to biased parameter estimates (Benson & Nasser, 1998; 
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Preacher & MacCallum, 2003). As such, this technique is appropriate to use only for data 
reduction; it is inappropriate to use PCA for the purposes of identifying latent constructs 
that explain shared variance among items. The more appropriate technique to use would 
have been exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Unlike PCA, EFA does distinguish 
common variance from error variance. Thus, the factors are created from only the 
common variance among the items. By incorporating measurement error into the model, 
more accurate parameter estimates are possible (Benson & Nasser; Preacher & 
MacCallum). Consequently, EFA should be used instead if the goal is to explore the 
underlying attributes thought to drive responses to the items. Second, each study 
employed varimax rotation, which assumes that the components are uncorrelated (i.e., 
orthogonal). The use of orthogonal rotation is rarely appropriate, especially if the 
researcher is uncertain about the relationships among the components or factors (Preacher 
& MacCallum). In fact, Hong and Faedda found moderate relationships between the four 
subscale scores (ranging from .21 to .44), which suggests the components would also be 
correlated. The more appropriate technique would have been to use oblique rotation 
because it allows the components (or factors) to be correlated. In addition to using PCA 
with varimax rotation, Hong and her colleagues also only reported reliability estimates 
for the total score, despite finding four “orthogonal” components. Estimating reliability 
for the total HPRS score instead of the subscale scores communicates (and assumes) that 
the four subscales all measure the same thing (i.e., items are homogenous). Given the 
existence of four components, this method of reporting is inappropriate. Third, Hong and 
her colleagues championed three different structures of the HPRS but did not highlight, 
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much less explain, these differences across studies, which can lead to further confusion 
regarding the factor structure and scoring of the HPRS.  
Fortunately, Thomas, Donnell, and Buboltz (2001) addressed these and other 
issues in the fourth psychometric study of the HPRS. They used confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) to test the four competing models proposed by Hong and colleagues 
(Hong, 1992; Hong & Faedda, 1996; Hong & Page, 1989). Using two different American 
undergraduate samples (N = 539 and 905, respectively), the factor structures of both the 
11- and 14-item versions of the scale were evaluated twice: once forcing the factors to be 
orthogonal and once allowing them to correlate. As they anticipated, the models only had 
adequate fit when the four factors were allowed to correlate. Factor correlations ranged 
from .29 and .72 for the 11-item scale, and .30 to .81 for the 14-item scale. Of the four 
competing models, only Hong and Faedda’s four-factor structure for the 14- and 11-item 
versions of the scale was found to have adequate fit. Reliabilities for the four subscales 
ranged from .48 to .63 for the 14-item version and .48 to .64 for the 11-item version, 
which are low. Given the moderate to high correlations among the factors, Thomas et al. 
also evaluated whether a second-order model would represent the data. Testing a second-
order model assesses whether the first-order factors are a function of an overarching 
factor. The second-order model did not exhibit adequate fit and thus, computing a total 
HPRS score in addition to the four subscales was not supported. Because of the low 
reliabilities of the four subscale scores, Thomas et al. advocated that the HPRS should not 
be used until it was studied further and improved. 
 Shen and Dillard (2005) conducted the fifth HPRS psychometric study of the 
factor structure of the HPRS with three different samples of American undergraduates. 
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The first two samples (N = 188 and 200) completed the 14-item version, and the third 
sample (N= 233) completed the 11-item version. Although both versions of the scale 
were administered, only the 11-item version was reported for all three samples in order to 
be “more parsimonious” (p. 77). This is disconcerting because the three removed items 
may have improved reliability. Shen and Dillard found the correlated four-factor model 
supported by Thomas et al. (2001) fit adequately across the three different samples. 
Factor correlations ranged from .45 to .76, further supporting the use of oblique rotation. 
They also tested a second-order model and found adequate fit. Because a second-order 
model fit the data, a total HPRS score, in addition to the four subscale scores, could be 
computed. The reliabilities for the total score across the three samples were adequate (!= 
.75, .80, and .79, respectively) and much higher than subscales reliabilities, which ranged 
from .45 to .71. Hence, Shen and Dillard advocated for the calculation of a total HPRS 
score.  
In an attempt to resolve the competing recommendations concerning the scoring 
and use of the HPRS, Brown, Finney, and France (2009) further examined the 
dimensionality of the 14-item version of the HPRS. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
was used to test four models: a one-factor model, the four-factor model championed by 
Hong and Faedda (1996) and Thomas et al. (2001), a second-order model, and a bifactor 
model. A bifactor model is similar to a single-factor model in that all the items represent 
a common factor (called the general factor). However, by incorporating several specific 
factors, this model also accounts for shared variance among sets of items that cannot be 
explained by the general factor. In other words, subsets of items that share unique 
variance with one another over and above the general factor are modeled to represent 
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specific factors (Chen, West, & Sousa, 2006). Specifically, Brown et al. tested a bifactor 
model in which a general factor of trait reactance was used to explain common variance 
among all 14 HPRS items. In addition, specific factors were modeled to explain 
additional variance among sets of items after controlling for general trait reactance (see 
Figure 1). These specific factors explained additional variance among the same sets of 
items as Hong and Faedda’s (1996) first-order factors (see Figure 1). However, despite 
the fact that the specific factors and first order factors both describe variance among the 
same sets of items, they are not the same factors. This is because the specific factors are 
orthogonal to trait reactance, where as the first-order factors describe dimensions of 
reactance and hence, are related to reactance. To reflect this difference, Brown et al. 
labeled the specific factors, attempting to reflect what the items may have in common 
over and above trait reactance (e.g., wording, context; see Figure 1). They labeled the 
specific factor for the Emotional Response Toward Restricted Choice items Anger 
because each item referenced an emotion relating to anger (e.g., “aggravates,” 
“frustrated,” “irritates,” angry”). The Reactance to Compliance items specific factor was 
labeled Rules and Regulations because each of the items referenced resisting rules and 
regulations (e.g., “Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me”). The specific factor 
for the Resisting Influence from Others items was labeled Independence because each 
item referenced seeking autonomy (e.g., “I am content only when I am acting of my own 
free will”). Finally, Brown et al., observed that the Reactance Toward Advice and 
Recommendations items seem to share additional variance because they both referenced 
getting advice. Thus, the name of this specific factor is Advice. 
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To test these models, Brown et al. (2009) administered the 14-item version of the 
HPRS to 1282 American undergraduates. As expected, the one-factor model did not fit 
well in a general sense (i.e., globally) as evidenced by Comparative Fit Index, Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation, and Standardized Root Mean Residual.  The model also 
exhibited poor fit in specific areas of the model (i.e., locally), with large standardized 
covariance residuals. The four-factor model fit better than the one-factor model, but 
global fit was still poor and there was local misfit associated with four items. Because the 
four-factor model did not fit, the more parsimonious second-order model would not have 
adequate fit either. In fact, the second-order model did not converge to an admissible 
solution due to a negative disturbance term associated with the Resisting Influence from 
Others factor.  
The bifactor model fit well globally, but had local areas of misfit associated with 
items 3, 9, and 13. Despite representing different specific factors, all three items referred 
to “doing the opposite” (see Appendix A). Furthermore, none of the Independence items 
had significant relationships with the specific factor (i.e., non-significant pattern 
coefficients). That is, there was no systematic variance shared between these items over 
and above the general factor of reactance. Methodologists recommend modeling these 
types of items as simply a function of the general factor, referred to as an incomplete 
bifactor model (Chen, et al., 2006; see Figure 2). This incomplete bifactor model did not 
fit the data significantly worse than the full bifactor model, supporting the decision to 
remove the Independence specific factor from the model. To address the local misfit 
associated with items 3, 9, and 13, a new specific factor labeled Opposite was added to 
represent this unexplained systematic variance (see Figure 2). Brown et al. concluded that 
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this incomplete bifactor model with the Opposite specific factor fit well both globally and 
locally. Accordingly, they suggested modeling the HPRS responses with a general trait 
reactance factor, noting that systematic variance due to item context and wording must 
also be modeled via specific factors. Although the incomplete bifactor model with the 
Opposite specific factor adequately represented the inter-item relationships, Brown et al. 
acknowledged that additional study of the HPRS factor structure is warranted because 
model modifications were made post hoc and were assessed using the same sample 
(MacCallum, Rozonowski, & Necowitz, 1992). In addition, they noted that the four 
specific factors needed further study, specifically in how they relate to external variables 
to figure out whether they are substantively meaningful or simply sources of construct-
irrelevant variance (i.e., method factors). For example, the Anger specific factor could be 
a method effect caused by the use of emotional words in each item. The Rules and 
Regulations specific factor may represent attitudes toward rules and regulations or a 
method effect due to similar wording. The Advice specific factor may represent attitudes 
toward advice and recommendations or a method effect due to similar wording. Finally, 
the Opposite specific factor seems to represent extreme non-compliance or a wording 
method effect. 
External Stage 
Although the factor structure, and thus the scoring of the HPRS clearly needs 
further study, researchers have examined the relationship between scores on the HPRS 
and measures of other constructs. In all but one study (Hong & Faedda, 1996), only the 
HPRS total score was correlated with external variables, further emphasizing the lack of 
consistency between the observed factor structure and the scoring of this measure. Given 
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this confusion, caution should be used when interpreting the relationship between the 
total reactance score and external variables. Moreover, as previously stated, empirical 
relationships between variables only provide external validity evidence if hypotheses 
regarding these relationships are specified a priori (Benson, 1998). In order to best 
evaluate the external validity evidence, the following sections will only review studies 
that made a priori hypotheses, thus gathering true external validity evidence. 
As predicted, the HPRS was positively related to trait anger and depression (Hong 
& Faedda, 1996), loneliness (Joubert, 1990), and narcissism (Joubert, 1992), and 
negatively related to happiness, “conventional mores” (conformity, conventionality, and 
humility), and conformity (Joubert, 1990). In addition to studying the correlates of trait 
reactance in a “testing” environment (e.g., via a battery of questionnaires), the HPRS has 
also been studied in reactance-inducing situations (e.g., reading a persuasive message). 
As expected, in these situations the HPRS was positively related to perceived threat to 
freedom (Shen & Dillard, 2005), and negatively related to individuals’ positive attitudes 
toward the message and their intention to comply (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Shen & 
Dillard). Furthermore, Dillard and Shen modeled state reactance as a latent construct 
comprised of anger and negative cognitions and found that people high in trait reactance 
also experienced greater state reactance.  
Theorists hypothesized that the HPRS would have a positive relationship with 
locus of control, with higher trait reactance associated with an internal locus of control 
(Brehm & Brehm, 1981). However, a positive relationship between the two variables has 
not been empirically supported (Hong et al., 2001; Hong & Faedda, 1996). It was also 
expected that the HPRS would be negatively related to life satisfaction because of its 
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documented inverse relationship with happiness (Joubert, 1990). Again, this hypothesis 
was not supported (Hong & Faedda; Hong & Giannakopoulos, 1994). Finally, it was 
predicted that the HPRS would negatively correlate with religiosity (Hong & Faedda, 
1996) and church attendance (Hong, 1990), but no such relationship was found.  
Purpose of the Current Study 
Given the confusion regarding the factor structure and scoring of the HPRS and 
the limited external validity evidence, the purpose of the current study was to further 
investigate its construct validity by (1) testing the factor structure of the HPRS and thus, 
contributing to the structural stage, and (2) examining theoretically-expected 
relationships with external variables to gather external validity evidence for the external 
stage.  
Structural Stage: Dimensionality 
The first purpose involved testing the six CFA models specified by Brown et al. 
(2009): (1) a one-factor model assessing the unidimensionality of the HPRS, (2) a four-
factor model representing Emotional Response Toward Restricted Choice, Reactance to 
Compliance, Resisting Influence from Others, and Reactance Toward Advice and 
Recommendations, (3) a second-order model, (4) the original bifactor model, and (5) the 
incomplete bifactor model, and (6) the incomplete bifactor model with the Opposite 
specific factor (see Figures 1 and 2). Given Brown et al.’s study, this modified 
incomplete bifactor model (Model 6) is hypothesized to best represent the data. 
External Stage: Nomological Network 
The second purpose of the study involved relating factors from the championed 
factor structure to the following theoretically-related variables: (1) general conformity, 
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(2) the Big Five personality traits (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, and openness to experiences), and (3) psychological entitlement. These 
variables were chosen due to their theoretically-expected relationships with reactance. 
Examining these relationships provides validity for the uses and inferences made from 
the HPRS.  
General conformity. General conformity refers to the extent to which individuals 
yield to others with more power (Santor et al., 2000). Considering that reactance involves 
resisting pressure from others that constrains one’s freedom, trait reactance should, 
theoretically, be negatively related to conformity. That is, as reactance increases, 
conformity should decrease. This hypothesis is also supported by previous empirical 
findings. Scores on the HPRS were negatively correlated with a measure of conventional 
mores, which was described as representing conformity, conventionality, and humility 
traits (Joubert, 1990). The tendency to conform was also negatively correlated with the 
therapeutic reactance scale (TRS; Dowd et al., 1991; Goldsmith et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, individuals higher in trait reactance were more likely to respond that they 
resist rules and regulations (Dowd et al., 1994), or disregard them all together (Buboltz et 
al., 1999). 
The Big Five. To date, no study has examined the relationship between trait 
reactance and the Big Five. However, the related construct of reactive autonomy has been 
related to the Big Five. Reactive autonomy refers to freedom from being controlled or 
influenced by others (Murray, 1938). Although related, reactive autonomy is different 
from trait reactance. Specifically, trait reactance is a tendency to experience a 
motivational state that is aroused when a freedom is threatened or eliminated, whereas 
17 
 
 
reactant autonomy refers to the actual state of being free from outside influences. In one 
study, reactive autonomy was regressed on the Big Five variables. Only agreeableness, 
openness to experience, and extraversion were significant predictors of reactive 
autonomy. Reactive autonomy was positively related to openness to experience and 
extraversion, and negatively related to agreeableness (Koestner & Losier, 1996). 
Conscientiousness and neuroticism were not significant predictors of reactive autonomy 
when controlling for the other three personality traits. Given Koestner and Loiser’s 
findings and the lack of studies relating trait reactance to the Big Five, hypotheses will 
only be made with regard to the openness to experience, extraversion, and agreeableness 
subscales. 
 People high on extraversion are characterized as being energetic, sociable, 
forceful, outgoing, adventurous, and enthusiastic (Costa & McCrae, 1992; as cited in 
John & Srivastava, 1999). Individuals high in trait reactance have been found to be 
aggressive, attention-seeking, dominant, assertive, and confident (Dowd & Wallbrown, 
1993; Dowd et al., 1994), as well as ambitious, adventurous, and domineering (Buboltz et 
al., 1999). Therefore, it is hypothesized that trait reactance is positively associated with 
extraversion. 
 People high in agreeableness are characterized as trusting and forgiving, 
compliant, modest, sympathetic, altruistic, and undemanding (Costa & McCrae, 1992; as 
cited in John & Srivastava, 1999). Given that individuals high in trait reactance have been 
found to be more aggressive, quarrelsome, irritable, hostile, and defensive (Dowd & 
Wallbrown, 1993) as well as less cooperative and helpful (Buboltz et al., 1999), trait 
reactance is predicted to be negatively associated with agreeableness. 
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People high in openness to experience are characterized as being curious, 
imaginative, artistic, unconventional, excitable, and having wide-ranging interests (Costa 
& McCrae, 1992; as cited in John & Srivastava, 1999). Because individuals high in trait 
reactance have been found to be more open to new and different experiences than those 
low in trait reactance (Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993), it is hypothesized that trait reactance 
has a positive relationship with openness to experience.  
Psychological entitlement. Psychological entitlement, a component of narcissism, 
refers to the perception that one is worthy of more and has the right to more compared to 
other people (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). As such, 
entitlement involves a sense of being deserving and entitled. People feel deserving when 
they expect a positive outcome as a result of their own actions or character. People feel 
entitled when they expect a positive outcome simply “as a result of a social contract” 
(Campbell et al., p. 31). Thus, people that feel entitled may perceive that they have more 
freedoms, and of greater importance. Considering that the experience of reactance 
depends on the characteristics of the threatened freedom (i.e., the number of freedoms 
threatened and the importance of those freedoms), it is hypothesized that trait reactance is 
positively related to psychological entitlement. That is, people that feel entitled may place 
a higher value on their freedoms and consequently, may be more prone to defend them 
when threatened. This hypothesis is also based on empirical findings. Although trait 
reactance has not been studied directly in relation to entitlement, it has been correlated 
with narcissism, which, as noted above, is associated with entitlement (Joubert, 1992). 
 In addition to testing a priori hypotheses, an exploratory approach will be taken to 
examine the relationships among the specific factors with external variables if a bifactor 
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model is championed. Given that the specific factors have not been studied before, doing 
so will help determine if they are substantively meaningful or simply method effects. 
Although an exploratory approach will be utilized, examining the relationships between 
the specific factors and external variables contributes to our understanding of the 
meaning (or lack of meaning) of the four specific factors.  
  
CHAPTER 2 
Review of the Literature 
An Overview of Freedom 
Freedom is a broad concept, but has generally been described as the ability to act 
without coercion or constraint (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2009). More 
specifically, two types of freedom have been identified: the freedom to and the freedom 
from (Berlin, 1958). That is, freedom can be conceptualized in a positive (i.e., freedom 
to) or negative (i.e., freedom from) sense. According to Berlin, positive freedoms refer to 
the ability to act in a self-determined way to ultimately reach one’s potential and negative 
freedoms refer to the ability to act without interference from other people or events.  
For the past century, psychologists have used multiple perspectives to better understand 
freedom. For example, researchers have used the concepts of autonomy and 
independence to describe aspects of freedom. According to self-determination theory 
(SDT), a person feels autonomous when they believe that they have the ability to direct 
their own behavior and behave in a way congruent with one’s own needs and interests 
(Deci & Ryan, 2004). It is characterized by “ownership, authenticity, responsibility, and 
choice” (Koestner & Losier, 1996, p. 467), and seems to represent what Berlin referred to 
as positive freedom. In addition, several theorists have asserted that autonomy and 
independence (and thus freedom) are essential components of optimal functioning and 
well-being. For example, self-determination theory (SDT) posits that the fulfillment of 
the need for autonomy, in addition to competence and relatedness, increases 
psychological well-being (Deci & Ryan).  
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Although both autonomy and independence have been used to describe freedom, 
Deci and Ryan (2004) differentiated autonomy from independence. According to Deci 
and Ryan, independence refers to not relying other people or other external sources. From 
this perspective, autonomy is not synonymous with independence. It is possible, for 
example, to be autonomously dependent (i.e., choosing to be dependent) or un-
autonomously independent (i.e., being forced to be independent).  
 Interestingly, autonomy has not always been conceptualized in this way (i.e., the 
ability to direct one’s own behavior). Some theorists have described autonomy as the 
ability to act without being influenced or controlled by other people (e.g., Murray, 1938). 
This view of autonomy seems to represent what Berlin (1958) referred to as negative 
freedom. In contrast to SDT’s conceptualization of autonomy, this view argues that those 
seeking autonomy, “wish neither to lead or be led, [but] …want to go their own way, 
uninfluenced and uncoerced by others” (Murray, p. 151). As with Deci and Ryan’s 
(2004) conceptualization of autonomy, it could be argued that this second definition of 
autonomy is also distinct from independence. That is, it is possible to be influenced by 
other people (i.e., be un-autonomous), but not rely on them (i.e., be independent).  
 Although both conceptualizations of autonomy seem to reflect acting of one’s 
own will, they differ with respect to how external influences are perceived. According to 
SDT, a person can feel autonomous even if others influence them, as long as the person 
endorses that influence. Said another way, autonomy includes making decisions based on 
one’s own interests and values as well as on external influences. In contrast, Murray’s 
(1938) definition of autonomy is characterized by opposing and remaining free of all 
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external influences. Accordingly, the two different conceptualizations have been termed 
reflective autonomy and reactive autonomy respectively (Koestner & Losier, 1996).  
 An alternative perspective of freedom is psychological reactance theory (PRT). 
Psychological reactance is similar to yet distinct from reactive autonomy, with the former 
focusing on people’s reactions when specific behavioral freedoms that are threatened by 
other people or circumstances, and the latter referring to a general avoidance of being 
influenced.  
The Theory of Psychological Reactance 
  According to PRT, when a perceived behavioral freedom is threatened with 
elimination, individuals will experience an arousal in motivation directed toward re-
establishing the threatened freedom; that is, they will experience psychological reactance 
(Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). For example, college students typically only have 
classes on weekdays. As such, it could be argued that most students feel free to engage in 
activities of their own choosing over the weekend. Consider that for some reason, an 
instructor scheduled class one Saturday morning, which was met with resistance from 
several students. From the perspective of these students, having class on a Saturday 
threatened their freedom to do what they wanted over the weekend. In turn, these students 
experienced an aversive motivational state (i.e., psychological reactance) aimed at 
restoring their freedom to have the day “off” from school. In an attempt to restore this 
freedom, several of the students urged the instructor to consider moving class to an 
alternate day during the week. However, the instructor was not willing to reschedule the 
class. Consequently, some students reacted by skipping that class, presumably because 
they were motivated to restore their freedom.  
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 As illustrated by the example above, psychological reactance can be 
conceptualized as a situational (i.e., state) experience, however it has evolved to 
encompass the conceptualization of reactance as a dispositional (i.e., trait) characteristic 
of people. Thus, there are two congruent conceptualizations of reactance: (1) as a 
response to a specific threatened freedom (e.g., not having Saturday “off”), and (2) as a 
disposition to exhibit that response. An overview of the theoretical underpinnings of how 
trait reactance evolved from the study of state reactance follows.  
Determinants of State Reactance 
 State reactance has been conceptualized as consisting of two key antecedents: a 
behavioral freedom and a threat to that behavioral freedom (Dillard & Shen, 2005). From 
this perspective, characteristics of the freedom and the threat to that freedom determine if 
and how much reactance an individual will experience in a given situation.  
Behavioral freedoms. PRT assumes individuals have a set of behaviors they are 
free to exercise during the present moment or in the future (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). Accordingly, behavioral freedoms are defined as any imaginable act 
(including thoughts and beliefs) that can realistically be engaged in by an individual. For 
a behavior to be considered free, however, “the individual must have the relevant 
physical and psychological abilities to engage in them, and must know, by experience, by 
general custom, or by formal agreement, that he may engage in them” (Brehm, p. 4). In 
other words, for a behavioral freedom to exist, a person must be able to exercise the 
freedom and be aware that they have the ability to do so. Free behaviors may be 
characterized as external, observable actions or as internal processes (Brehm & Brehm). 
Internal processes refer to unobservable events that occur within an individual’s mind 
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including one’s thoughts, feelings, and beliefs (Brehm). For example, an individual may 
hold a certain political belief that could potentially be threatened through persuasion. 
Thus, a person can engage in a behavioral freedom simply by having a particular belief, 
thought, or emotion. 
It is important to understand certain characteristics of the threatened freedom(s) 
because they influence the experience of reactance.  Specifically, the magnitude of 
reactance depends on (1) the importance of the freedom to the individual, and (2) the 
number (and proportion) of freedoms threatened (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). 
According to PRT, the magnitude of reactance arousal will increase as a direct function 
of the importance of the threatened freedom. In order for a behavioral freedom to be 
important to an individual, it must serve some unique function with regard to satisfying a 
need or desire (e.g., the need to make free and independent decisions or the desire for a 
luxury car). It is also necessary to consider the importance of a freedom relative to the 
importance of other currently held freedoms. To illustrate this, consider a person that is 
choosing between three options: two that are moderately important and one that is very 
important. If one of the moderately important alternatives is threatened, PRT assumes 
that less reactance would be aroused compared to a situation in which all three options 
are moderately important. This is because the very important alternative would still 
available in the former scenario, leaving one to choose between a very important option 
and a moderately important option. In the words of Brehm, “When one’s choice 
alternatives are an orange, an apple, and a pear, he should experience a noticeable degree 
of reactance when someone swipes the apple; but when the choice alternatives are an 
orange, an apple, and an automobile, one will not care much about the loss of an apple,” 
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(p. 5-6). Hence, the magnitude of reactance is also a function of the relative importance 
of the behavioral freedom.  
According to PRT, a person will also experience more reactance if several related 
freedoms are threatened, compared to if only one were threatened. Specifically, the 
magnitude of reactance becomes larger with increases in the number and proportion of 
freedoms that are threatened. The number of freedoms is simply a total count of the 
number of freedoms threatened, where as the proportion of freedoms refers to the ratio of 
how many freedoms are threatened out of the set of freedoms a person currently holds. 
Although they are related (i.e., an increase in the number of freedoms threatened is also 
usually accompanied by an increase in the proportion of freedoms threatened), PRT 
differentiates between the two because reactance will increase as the number of freedoms 
increases, even when the proportion of freedoms threatened stays the same. Imagine, for 
example, that a person has four freedoms at a given point in time, and one freedom is 
threatened. In this case, a certain amount of reactance would be aroused, but PRT asserts 
that a person would experience more reactance if three freedoms out of twelve were 
threatened. In this example, more reactance would be experienced because more 
freedoms were threatened, despite holding the proportion of threatened freedoms constant 
at 1:4 ratio. Conversely, PRT also predicts that individuals will experience more 
reactance if one out of four, compared to one out of six freedoms are threatened. In this 
example, more reactance would be experienced because a greater proportion of freedoms 
was threatened, despite holding the number of freedoms threatened constant.  
Finally, although PRT primarily addresses freedoms that exist in the present 
moment, people also perceive themselves as having freedoms that exist in the future. It is 
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therefore possible that current freedoms will have some impact on future freedoms. Just 
as a threat to one freedom can threaten other currently held freedoms, it can also threaten 
a future freedom, increasing the magnitude of reactance. For example, a teenager that is 
told they are not allowed to go to the movies with their friends on a particular night may 
experience more reactance if they perceive that going to the movies with their friends in 
the future is also threatened, compared to if the threat were only limited to the present 
behavioral freedom.   
 Threats to behavioral freedoms. As previously stated, psychological reactance is 
aroused when behavioral freedoms are threatened with elimination. A threat is a force 
that makes or could make a behavioral freedom more difficult to exercise (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981). This threat can range in magnitude, and can be so strong that the 
individual considers the freedom to be permanently eliminated.  
 As such, the magnitude of reactance is also a function of (1) the magnitude of the 
threat, (2) the number of threats, (3) the interaction between the importance of the 
freedom and magnitude of the threat, and (4) the context. In general, PRT predicts that 
reactance arousal will increase as the magnitude of the threat increases (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Recall that a threat is anything that increases the difficulty of 
exercising a behavioral freedom (Brehm & Brehm). Therefore, the magnitude of 
reactance is a function of the force of the threat. Consider, for example, an employee that 
received a company-wide memo explaining that it is no longer acceptable for employees 
to send personal emails during work. Although a noticeable amount of reactance would 
likely be experienced, the magnitude of reactance would probably be substantially greater 
if the memo also informed employees that their emails would be monitored and they 
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would be reprimanded for violations. Doing so would make it more difficult for the 
employee to exercise the freedom to send personal emails at work, which would increase 
the force of the threat and consequently, increase the magnitude of reactance. According 
to PRT, when the force becomes relatively great, it may reach a point where the 
individual no longer perceives a threat to a behavioral freedom, but rather the elimination 
of that freedom. This change in perception is believed to occur when the perceived 
magnitude of the threat becomes larger than the importance of the freedom; elimination 
effectively occurs when resisting the threat becomes more costly than giving up the 
freedom. For example, if the employee believed that sending personal emails at work was 
not worth the risk of being caught and reprimanded, the employee may perceive this 
freedom as effectively eliminated.  
 Thus far, we have discussed the effects of a single threat to a behavioral freedom. 
A freedom, however, may have several threats simultaneously. In any given situation, 
there may be several forces making a number of freedoms more difficult to exercise. 
Because multiple threats are thought to have a collective effect, reactance is thought to be 
greater in situations involving several threats to a freedom.  
 Although the magnitude of reactance arousal increases as the force of the threat 
increases, the magnitude of the threat also interacts with the importance of the freedom. 
Said differently, the importance of the freedom moderates the relationship between force 
of the threat and reactance (see Figures 3 and 4). For freedoms that are of low 
importance, only small amounts of reactance can be elicited, even for highly forceful 
threats. In such situations, PRT predicts that threats to relatively unimportant freedoms 
will result in compliance. Threats can arouse large amounts of reactance for more 
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important freedoms, but this may result in a negative influence (i.e., non-compliance) in 
which the individual engages in the free behavior despite the threat against it. If the force 
is great enough, however, a positive effect (i.e., compliance) will occur. This pattern is 
especially common for moderately important freedoms, and is termed a boomerang 
effect. The boomerang effect occurs when a force against a freedom results in non-
compliance up to a certain point after which increased force results in greater compliance. 
In contrast, PRT asserts that there will be no boomerang effect for highly important 
freedoms. As the force of the threat increases, so will reactance, resulting in greater 
amounts of non-compliance (see Figures 3 and 4). Consider, for example, three children 
that were told by their parents that they would no longer be allowed to watch a certain 
television show. The youngest son never watched the show much (i.e., low importance 
freedom), and consequently did not experience much reactance, so complied with this 
request immediately. The middle son did like this show somewhat (i.e., moderate 
importance freedom), and experienced more reactance than his younger brother. At first, 
the middle son did not obey his parents, but he complied when they threatened to punish 
him for watching it (i.e., increase in threat), illustrating the boomerang effect. 
Unfortunately for the parents, this television show was the oldest son’s favorite (i.e., high 
importance freedom). As such, he experienced a great deal of reactance and continued to 
watch the show despite his parent’s increased threats of punishment.  
 Moreover, the situation surrounding the threat is believed to moderate the amount 
of reactance experienced. If there is a believable justification for the threat, and that 
justification is viewed as legitimate, then reactance may be attenuated. For example, 
consider a college professor that changed the due date of a paper from the day after 
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students returned from Spring Break to the day before the break started. In response to 
this, many students experienced reactance because they had less time than they had 
expected to complete the assignment. Furthermore, they questioned whether this 
alteration in due date meant that all future due dates were also subject to change. 
However, the level of reactance experienced by the students was lessened when the 
professor justified moving the due date to make it easier on the students. That is, the 
professor reasoned that it would be less stressful and students would enjoy their vacation 
more if the paper were due before Spring Break. As a result, most of the students felt less 
reactant and accepted this change. This justification may have attenuated the reactance 
aroused in the students by limiting the threat to that one specific paper, without implying 
that the due dates of other assignments would be altered. However, the extent to which a 
justification attenuates the arousal of reactance also depends on its legitimacy. In the 
current example, this justification would not be effective if students disagreed with the 
professor and instead, believed that it would be better to have the paper be due after break 
because they would experience less stress.   
 In sum, the magnitude of reactance is a function of the characteristics of the 
freedom and the threat. Specifically, reactance is expected to increase as the importance 
of the freedom increases, and as the number (and proportion) of freedoms that are 
threatened increases. In general, reactance will also increase as the strength of the threat 
increases. However, the effect of the magnitude of the threat on reactance is moderated 
by the importance the freedom is to the individual, and the justification for the threat. 
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Outcomes of State Reactance 
The effects of state reactance can manifest behaviorally or attitudinally. The main 
behavioral outcomes as defined by PRT concern restoring threatened freedoms. These 
freedoms can be re-established directly or indirectly depending on the situation. Direct 
re-establishment of a threatened freedom occurs when an individual engages in the free 
behavior that is threatened. For example, talking on the cell phone may be banned in 
certain areas, but a person can directly re-establish this freedom by using one anyway. 
Brehm (1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981) theorized that individuals are more likely to 
attempt direct re-establishment if the magnitude of reactance is large and the likelihood 
of successfully re-establishing the threatened or eliminated freedom is high. In addition, 
if the cost associated with direct re-establishment outweighs its benefits (e.g., the 
possibility of getting a fine for using the cell phone vs. the convenience of using a phone 
in the car), direct-re-establishment will not be attempted (Brehm & Brehm).  
When direct re-establishment of a freedom is not possible, individuals may 
attempt indirect restoration instead. An individual may indirectly attempt to re-establish a 
threatened freedom by engaging in other behaviors related to the threatened freedom 
(Brehm, 1966). For example, one may indirectly re-establish the freedom to talk on their 
cell phone while driving by using a “hands-free” device in areas in which it is prohibited. 
Freedoms can also be indirectly restored through the actions of an external agent. For 
example, if a teacher told a child that they would no longer be allowed to eat lunch with 
her friends, the child’s parents could arrange a meeting with the teacher to restore the 
child’s freedom to eat with her friends. 
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If the freedom is irrevocably eliminated, then the chances of successfully 
restoring the free behavior by directly engaging in it are low. Consequently, direct re-
establishment most likely will not be attempted (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). However, if the 
individual is unaware or uncertain that the freedom is lost permanently, they may still 
attempt direct restoration, but it will not be successful. Recall the example of the 
company memo informing its employees that they would no longer be able to send 
personal emails at work. Imagine that one employee knew that he was not supposed to 
send personal emails, but decided to try anyway only to discover that his personal email 
website was now blocked.  
 In addition to behavioral outcomes, there are also subjective effects. (Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981; Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & Stephenson, 2007; Shen & Dillard, 2005). 
According to Brehm and Brehm, a general feeling of discomfort and uneasiness occurs 
with most incidents of reactance. Depending on the magnitude of reactance, it can also 
manifest as anger, hostility, and aggression (Brehm & Brehm). Furthermore, researchers 
studying reactance in the context of persuasion found that reactance is associated with 
negative attitudes toward persuasive messages (i.e., disagreeing with the message’s 
content) and non-compliant behavioral intentions (i.e., anticipating to behave in ways that 
are not promoted by the message) (Dillard & Shen; Quick & Stephenson; Shen & 
Dillard).  
In addition to aversive emotions, PRT also asserts that people perceive a 
threatened freedom as more attractive and consequently, will have a greater desire to 
engage in the free behavior (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). For example, if a 
teenager is told that they are not allowed to drink alcohol, PRT would predict that some 
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teenagers will experience a greater desire to drink alcohol simply because it is prohibited. 
Likewise, if an option from a set of alternatives is no longer available, PRT asserts that 
the eliminated option will be more attractive to the individual. 
Trait Reactance 
PRT originated from the social psychology tradition, which focuses on how 
aspects of the environment influence the behavior of people. From this perspective, the 
determinants of reactance are context-specific. That is, the experience of reactance is 
primarily determined by the characteristics of the behavioral freedom and the threat to 
that freedom. However, PRT has expanded to include the conceptualization of trait 
reactance. As such, researchers have asserted that individuals may vary in their tendency 
to experience reactance in general, independent of the situation (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). 
In other words, reactance has been conceptualized to be a personality trait. According to 
personality theorists, a trait denotes “a disposition to behave expressing itself in 
consistent patterns of functioning across a range of situations” (Pervin, 1994, p. 108). 
Hence, trait reactance represents a disposition to experience and express reactance across 
situations.  
Studying trait reactance may have particularly useful applications in higher 
education and organizations. Most universities strive to better understand their students in 
order to meet their needs and successfully support students while at the institution. One 
theory of development that is particularly relevant at this age posits that healthy college-
aged individuals must undergo differentiation of self, meaning that they must develop an 
independent sense of self while remaining emotionally connected to their families or 
peers (Bowen, 1978). In order to fully differentiate from their families of origin, 
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individuals must be able to function autonomously, without feeling controlled by one’s 
family, friends, or significant others. At the same time, however, they must be able to 
remain emotionally connected to these individuals, “while acting from an individuated 
position characterized by equality” (Johnson & Buboltz, 2000, p. 94). Johnson and 
Buboltz used the Family System Questionnaire, a measure of self-differentiation 
designed specifically for college students, to predict trait reactance. They found that 
individuals with higher levels of trait reactance were less able to function autonomously 
without feeling controlled by parents or peers (i.e., intergenerational and peer 
individuation) and reported feeling decreased levels emotional connection with friends or 
significant others (i.e., peer intimacy) compared to those low in trait reactance. This 
suggests that highly reactant individuals struggle with self-differentiation, as they are not 
able to function autonomously from their family or peers and have difficulty remaining 
emotionally connected with their peers. Clearly, trait reactance is an important aspect to 
consider in understanding how young individuals thrive in a university setting. 
Measuring trait reactance also has important implications in organizational 
settings. Because organizations vary in the degree of flexibility and autonomy offered to 
its employees, individuals with a great deal of trait reactance may not perform well in 
workplaces that depend on compliance, such as the military or law enforcement. In fact, 
Buboltz et al. (1999) concluded that highly reactant individuals might prefer to work in 
an atmosphere where they are able to work autonomously on activities of their choice 
without having to work closely with other people. Thus, measuring trait reactance could 
assist organizations in screening potential employees to ensure optimal person-
environment fit, maximizing performance and productivity. 
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Measuring State and Trait Reactance 
 Now that the theoretical background of state and trait reactance has been 
discussed, an overview of how both state and trait reactance are operationalized and 
measured is presented. Because psychological reactance theory began with state 
reactance, it is logical to start with the measurement of state reactance followed by how it 
differs from the measurement of trait reactance. 
Measuring State Reactance  
 Originally, Brehm and Brehm (1981) asserted that state reactance could not be 
measured directly because it “has the status of an intervening, hypothetical variable” (p. 
37). Thus, the majority of early research on reactance measured the outcomes of 
reactance, rather than formally studying the experience of reactance itself. For instance, 
most empirical studies of reactance measured changes in the attractiveness of choice 
alternatives. In most studies, the experimental procedure had participants rate the 
attractiveness of four items, one of which they would later be able to keep as a gift for 
participating in the study. The gifts in these studies were diverse, and included music 
records (Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, & Shaban, 1966), candy bars (Hammock & Brehm, 
1966), posters (Cherulnik & Citrin, 1974), paintings (Rhodewalt & Davison, 1983), and 
toys (Brehm, 1981). However, at the time that participants were supposed to pick up their 
gift, the experimenter informed each participant that the item they rated third highest in 
attractiveness would not be available after all. Following this news, the participants rated 
all four items on attractiveness again. In these studies, the increased attractiveness of an 
eliminated option was used as evidence of reactance. In general, these studies found that 
the attractiveness of the eliminated item increased from the first evaluation to the second, 
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indicating that state reactance had been elicited in response to decreased choice. 
 In addition to evaluating how reactance operates in decision-making situations, 
reactance has also been studied in the context of persuasion. In this line of research, 
participants were presented a persuasive message advocating for some form of healthy 
behavior (e.g., flossing regularly, drinking responsibly; Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & 
Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2007; Shen & Dillard, 2005). In these studies, 
participants completed several questionnaires after viewing a message advocating for 
healthy behavior. These questionnaires assessed participants’ perceived threat to freedom 
(Dillard & Shen; Quick & Considine; Quick & Stephenson; Shen & Dillard), their 
attitudes toward the message (Dillard & Shen; Shen & Dillard), and their intention to 
comply with what the message was advocating (Dillard & Shen; Shen & Dillard) or the 
perceived persuasiveness of the message (Quick & Considine; Quick & Stephenson). 
These researchers viewed the strength of the threat as an antecedent variable that leads to 
reactance, which in turn influences the consequences of attitude toward the message, 
behavioral intent to comply with the message, and how persuasive participants found the 
message to be.  
 Despite Brehm and Brehm’s (1981) assertion that state reactance itself could not 
be measured, Dillard and Shen (2005) nonetheless attempted to operationalize state 
reactance and measure it. In doing so, they recognized that state reactance had been 
explicitly and implicitly defined in several different ways. For instance, reactance has 
been theoretically and operationally defined as consisting only of cognitions (i.e., 
counter-arguing; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In addition, researchers observed that 
reactance often leads to anger. As such, reactance has been defined as an affective 
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experience (Dillard & Meijenders, 2002; Nabi, 2002). Because cognitions and affect can 
operate at the same time (i.e., parallel processing; Leventhal, 1990), Dillard and Shen 
reasoned that reactance could be defined as the additive effects of both cognitions and 
affect, or as the “intertwined” effects of both. As such, they tested four competing models 
of reactance that operationally defined reactance differently: (1) the Single Process 
Cognitive Model, (2) the Single Process Affective Model, (3) the Dual Process Model, 
and (4) the Intertwined Process Model. The Single Process Cognitive Model represented 
reactance as a cognitive experience that drives the resulting attitudes and behaviors. In 
contrast, the Single Process Affective Model represented reactance solely as anger. The 
third model, the Dual Process Model, represented reactance as the separate effects of both 
affect and cognition. And finally, the Intertwined Process Model represented reactance as 
the entangled effects of affect and cognition (see Figure 5).   
To test these models, Dillard and Shen (2005) conducted two studies using the 
same procedure, but with different persuasive messages. The first study used messages 
advocating flossing regularly and the second used messages warning participants against 
binge drinking, advocating drinking responsibly. For both studies, participants read a 
message that was either highly or minimally threatening. After reading the message, 
students answered a series of questions to assess their perception of the strength of the 
threat, level of trait reactance, anger, cognitive responses, attitude, and behavioral 
intention. To measure perceived threat, participants responded to four statements (e.g. 
“the message tried to manipulate me,” and “the message tried to pressure me”). Trait 
reactance was measured using the HPRS. Anger was measured by having participants 
indicate how irritated, angry, annoyed, and aggravated they felt. To measure cognitive 
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responses, participants were instructed to list the thoughts they had in response to the 
message. These responses were later coded for how supportive their attitudes were 
toward the message. Supportive thoughts consisted of responses that expressed 
agreement, compliance, or a positive attitude toward the message. Responses were coded 
as negative thoughts if they expressed disagreement, non-compliance, or a negative 
attitude toward the message. A neutral response consisted of statements that did not 
evaluate the message. In addition, participants responded to statements such as “Flossing 
regularly is…” using bipolar scales ranging from bad to good, foolish to wise, 
unfavorable to favorable, negative to positive, undesirable to desirable, unnecessary to 
necessary, and detrimental to beneficial. Responses to these items were analyzed to 
determine the extent to which they supported what the message was advocating. 
Behavioral intention was measured by a single item, in which participants indicated the 
likelihood that they will floss regularly, or drink less than three alcoholic beverages the 
following week, depending on the message they viewed.  
 Using structural equation modeling (SEM), Shen and Dillard (2005) found that 
the intertwined process model best represented the data, concluding that state reactance 
should be conceptualized as a latent variable consisting of state anger and negative (or 
counter-arguing) thoughts (see Figure 5). In this model, an increase in perceived threat to 
freedom and higher levels of trait reactance lead to the experience of state reactance 
(represented by anger and negative cognitions). The experience of state reactance was 
also associated with less support for the message (i.e., attitude) as well as weakened 
behavioral intentions to comply with the message. Dillard and Shen contended that this 
conceptualization of state reactance appears to be consistent with the original theory, 
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which postulates that state reactance can result in feelings of hostility, anger, and 
aggression (Brehm, 1961; Brehm & Brehm). Furthermore, defining reactance as a latent 
variable comprised of anger and negative cognitions has since been supported by several 
other studies, also in the context of persuasion (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2007). 
It is important to note, however, that Brehm (1966) explicitly states that reactance 
is not simply an aversive feeling that people try to reduce in any way possible (such as by 
directly restoring the threatened behavioral freedom). Rather, it is a motivational state to 
recover that freedom. Further, Dillard and Shen (2005) acknowledged that 
conceptualizing state reactance as the manifestation of counter-arguing and anger may 
not align with the original theory of reactance because counter-arguing and anger could 
be interpreted as outcomes of reactance, rather than reactance itself. However, Dillard 
and Shen argued that by interpreting the theory in this way, state reactance could not be 
measured, which from their perspective is undesirable. Thus, operationalizing state 
reactance in this way is still somewhat controversial and is still up for debate. 
Fortunately, trait reactance seems to be more easily measured.  
Measuring Trait Reactance 
 Recall that in the Intertwined Process Model (see Figure 5), in addition to 
behavioral freedom and the threat to that freedom, trait reactance was specified as an 
additional antecedent of state reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005). Dillard and Shen found 
that trait reactance had a significant positive association with the experience of state 
reactance. In their model, trait reactance indirectly predicted less favorable attitudes 
toward the persuasive message and decreased behavioral intention to comply with the 
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message. In a different study, trait reactance was positively correlated with perceived 
threat to freedom and negatively correlated with attitude and intention to comply with the 
message (Shen & Dillard, 2005). Thus, trait reactance appears to be an important 
antecedent of behavioral outcomes related to persuasion and compliance. 
 Evidently, conceptualizing reactance as a trait has been helped communication 
and marketing researchers gain insight as to why some persuasive messages have an 
effect opposite than what was intended (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & Stephenson, 
2007). It has also been used by cognitive therapists interested in better understanding 
difficult clients (e.g., Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993) and by industrial-organizational 
psychologists interested in predicting employee resistance to supervisory requests 
(Sachau et al., 1999).  
 As reviewed in Chapter 1, the HPRS is a popular measure of trait reactance. One 
may ask if other trait reactance measures exist and given the confusion regarding the 
scoring of the HPRS, if these should be used in its place. Below is a review of two 
popular trait reactance scales: the Questionnaire for the Measurement of Psychological 
Reactance (QMPR) and the Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS). As will be seen, both 
have limitations that lend support for the HPRS as a more promising measure of trait 
reactance.  
Questionnaire for the Measurement of Psychological Reactance (QMPR)  
Substantive stage. The Questionnaire for the Measurement of Psychological 
Reactance (QMPR) was developed by Merz (1983, as cited in Tucker & Byers, 1987) in 
German. Merz created 32 items to measure “key variables [including] those related to 
resistance, rules and regulations, boomerang-theory, and the tendency to do the opposite 
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to what others expect of you” (Tucker & Byers, p. 811). Four psychologists evaluated 
these 32 items. Six items were subsequently removed because they were considered 
inappropriate by two or more of the psychologists, resulting in a 26-item version of the 
QMPR. The resulting 26-item questionnaire was administered to 152 high school and 
undergraduate students who responded to each item on a scale from 1 (not at all 
appropriate) to 4 (extremely appropriate). In a later account of Merz’s study, however, 
Donnell, Thomas, and Buboltz (2001) reported that Merz used a 6-point Likert scale. 
Eight additional items were removed for unreported reasons, resulting in the final 18-item 
version of the QMPR (see Appendix B).  
  There are several concerns regarding the substantive stage of the QMPR. 
Specifically, it is unclear whether the theoretical dimensionality of trait reactance was 
adequately conceptualized prior to creating the QMPR. The two accounts of Merz’s 
(1983) study say that the items were written to represent various aspects of reactance 
(e.g., rules and regulations), but whether these aspects were meant to represent actual 
dimensions of trait reactance was never clearly articulated by Tucker and Byer (1989) nor 
Donnell et al. (2001). However, even though the dimensionality of the QMPR was not 
theoretically defined, studying its factor structure of the QMPR during the structural 
stage could inform the theory of trait reactance (i.e., substantive stage).  
 Structural stage. To date, four studies have examined the structure of the QMPR. 
In the first psychometric study, Merz (1983, as cited in Tucker & Byers, 1987) conducted 
a PCA with orthogonal rotation. Merz supported a four-component solution that 
accounted for 53% of the total variance, but did not label the components, nor report 
which items represented each component. Furthermore, estimates of internal consistency 
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(!), test-retest reliability, and split-half reliability were only reported for the total score 
(.90, .86 and .84, respectively), despite empirical support for a multidimensional solution.  
Unsatisfied with the lack of information regarding the structure of the QMPR 
reported by Merz (1983, as cited in Tucker & Byers, 1988), Tucker and Byers translated 
the scale to English and conducted the second psychometric study of the QMPR. They 
administered the 18-item English version to 218 American undergraduate students who 
responded to each item on a scale from 1 (not at all appropriate) to 5 (extremely 
appropriate). They conducted an EFA with oblique rotation to study the factor structure 
of the scale. In contrast to Merz’s finding of four components, a two-factor solution was 
interpreted, which accounted for 21% of the common variance. The two factors were 
labeled Behavioral Freedom (13 items) and Freedom of Choice (5 items). Behavioral 
Freedom appears to represent attitudes concerning free will and behavioral opposition, 
whereas Freedom of Choice seems to represent attitudes toward maintaining freedom in 
decision-making contexts. Tucker and Byers reported a correlation of .24 between the 
two factors, and curiously concluded that the subscales were “essentially orthogonal” (p. 
814). Estimates of reliability were not reported. Based on changes in the underlying 
factor structure of the QMPR, Tucker and Byers concluded that it should not be used 
because it is psychometrically unstable.  
In the third psychometric study of QMPR, Hong and Ostini (1989) administered 
Tucker and Byers (1987) English translation to 379 Australian undergraduate students 
who responded on a four-point Likert scale (anchors were not reported). They conducted 
EFAs with both orthogonal and oblique rotations. Unfortunately, they only presented the 
results of the orthogonal rotation, stating that the factor patterns were nearly identical for 
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both rotations and that the correlations between the oblique factors were negligible. A 
four-factor solution was interpreted and explained 44.1% of the common variance. 
Although simple structure was not achieved (i.e., items “loaded” on more than one 
factor), the four factors were labeled: Freedom in Decision and Behavior, Behavioral 
Reactance, Skepticism Towards Others’ Advice, and Conformity Reactance. Freedom in 
Decision and Behavior (8 items) reflects people’s attitudes toward maintaining their 
freedom to do what they want. Behavioral Reactance (6 items) reflects reactance that is 
expressed through observable behaviors. Skepticism Towards Others’ Advice (4 items) 
reflects reactance in response to being told what to do that manifests affectively. 
Conformity Reactance (3 items) reflects people’s attitudes toward following rules and 
regulations. Unfortunately, Hong and Ostini only reported estimates of internal 
consistency (!), and test-retest reliability: .80 and .77, respectively. Although both Merz 
(as cited in Tucker & Byers, 1988) and Hong and Ostini (1989) found four underlying 
dimensions of the QMPR, the lack of information about Merz’s study makes comparing 
the two difficult. Nevertheless, because some items loaded on more than one factor, Hong 
and Ostini contended that the factors were difficult to interpret and that the QMPR is 
psychometrically unacceptable.  
In the fourth psychometric study of the QMPR, Donnell et al. (2001) administered 
a slightly different English translation of the questionnaire to 898 American 
undergraduate students who responded using a scale of 1 (does not apply at all) to 6 
(always applies). They used both PCA and EFA to study the factor structure of the 
QMPR. A three-factor solution was interpreted, which accounted for 38.3% of the 
variance. The extracted factors were rotated with both orthogonal and oblique rotations. 
43 
 
 
Although both rotations resulted in similar pattern matrices, Donnell et al. interpreted the 
EFA with oblique rotation due to moderate correlations among the factors (which ranged 
from .25 to .35). Five items were removed because they had pattern coefficients less than 
.40. It is unclear whether the factor structure was reassessed using the remaining 13 
items. Nonetheless, the three factors were labeled: Response to Advice and 
Recommendations, Restriction of Freedom, and Preference for Confrontation. Response 
to Advice and Recommendations (7 items) represents negative attitudes toward the advice 
and suggestions of other people. Restriction of Freedom (3 items) represents negative 
attitudes toward people that interfere with one’s choices and decisions. Preference for 
Confrontation (3 items) represents the excitement people feel when contradicting others 
or disregarding rules. Donnell et al. reported an internal consistency estimate for the total 
score (! = .76), and stated that the subscale reliabilities were unacceptable. 
Unfortunately, the actual estimates of internal consistency for the subscales were not 
reported. Because of the changing factor structure of the QMPR and low subscale 
reliabilities, Donnell et al. concluded that the scale is not psychometrically sound and 
needs revision. 
There are several limitations regarding the study of the structure of the QMPR 
that must be addressed. First, it is important to point out that there are two different 
English translations of the QMPR. Thus, three different versions of the scale were 
studied: the original German version (Merz, 1983; as cited in Tucker & Byers, 1987), the 
first translated English version (Tucker & Byers, Hong & Ostini, 1989), and a second 
translated English version (Donnell et al., 2001). Although the two English translations 
are very similar, there are slight changes in wording. In addition, the response scale 
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changed across studies. In Merz’s original study, participants responded on either on a 4-
point (according to Tucker & Byers) or 6-point (according to Donnell et al.), with “not at 
all appropriate” and “extremely appropriate” as anchors. In Tucker and Byers’ study, they 
used a 6-point scale with the same anchors, despite reporting that Merz used a 4-point 
scale. Hong and Ostini, on the other hand, used the same anchors on a 4-point scale. 
Interestingly, Donnell et al. used a 6-point scale with “does not apply at all” and “always 
applies” as anchors. The differences in the scale anchors could be due to the slightly 
different translations across studies. Researchers may have chosen to use a 6-point scale 
instead of the 4-point scale because they wanted to achieve more variability in the 
responses. The changes in the wording of the QMPR across the three versions, as well as 
changes in the scale used could have affected how participants responded to the items. It 
is not surprising, then, that the factor structure of the items was not stable across the four 
studies: Merz reportedly found four dimensions, as did Hong and Ostini, whereas Tucker 
and Byers found two dimensions and Donnell et al. found three. Unfortunately, the 
empirical study of the structure of the QMPR did not provide conclusive evidence 
concerning the dimensionality of trait reactance, but all studies did interpret a 
multidimensional solution. Despite their differences, all four studies concluded that the 
scale should not be used because of ites unstable factor structure and undesirable 
psychometric properties.  
 Furthermore, questionable techniques and reporting practices were used in these 
studies. First, Merz supposedly conducted a PCA to examine the structure of the QMPR 
(Tucker & Byers, 1988). As discussed in Chapter 1, PCA does not account for 
measurement error in the items, which can lead to biased parameter estimates (Benson & 
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Nasser, 1998; Preacher & MacCallum, 2003). Thus, EFA would have been the more 
appropriate technique to use. In addition, several studies used a scree plot and/or the 
Kaiser criterion to determine how many factors to retain (Merz as cited in Tucker & 
Byers; Tucker & Byers; Hong & Ostini, 1989). Because Kaiser’s criterion can lead to 
inaccurate conclusions, other techniques to determine the number of factors to retain such 
as a parallel analysis (which involves plotting the Eigenvalues of randomly generated 
data with the observed Eigenvalues, and seeing where the two lines intersect) should have 
been utilized (Preacher & MacCallum). Finally, reliability estimates for the QMPR were 
only reported for the total score, despite finding multiple dimensions (Merz as cited in 
Tucker & Byers, Hong & Ostini, Donnell et al., 2001). It would have been more 
justifiable to report the reliability of each subscale of the QMPR. Unfortunately, Tucker 
and Byers did not even report any estimates of reliability for their sample, which is 
critical reliability is associated with test scores and is thus, sample dependent; reliability 
is not an inherent property of the test. 
External stage. Despite concluding that this measure should not be used, several 
researchers have studied the relationship between scores on the QMPR with measures of 
other constructs. Unfortunately, not one qualifies as an external validity study because (1) 
specific theory-based a priori hypotheses concerning the relationship between the QMPR 
and other variables of interest were not explicitly stated and tested, and (2) the factor 
structure, and thus scoring of the QMPR was questionable. These studies used the QMPR 
in an exploratory manner to examine possible relationships between reactance and 
measures of personality (Self-Directed Search, Buboltz et al., 1999; California 
Psychological Inventory, Dowd et al., 1994; Personality Research Form, Dowd & 
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Wallbrown, 1993) as well as developmental variables (Johnson & Buboltz, 2000). In 
addition, no gender differences have been found (Dowd et al., 1994; Dowd et al., 2001), 
nor any relationships with age (Dowd et al., 2001). It is important to note, however, these 
studies only examined the QMPR total score, possibly because of its unstable factor 
structure. Moreover, these studies emphasize that the QMPR is being used despite its 
psychometric limitations. Thus, a quality measure of trait reactance is needed.    
Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS). 
Substantive stage. Psychological reactance has been measured by therapists to 
better understand their clients, as it is believed to mediate counseling outcomes. To 
improve upon the psychometric shortcomings of the QMPR, Dowd et al. (1991) 
developed the Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS) to measure trait reactance in a therapy 
client population. After “careful examination of the definition of psychological reactance 
proposed by Brehm (1966),” two faculty members and six graduate students created an 
initial pool of 112 items to measure trait reactance (Dowd et al., p. 542). They defined 
trait reactance as a potential for reactance, or the tendency to be oppositional. Each item 
consisted of a statement to which participants responded using a scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). As with the QMPR, there are several concerns regarding 
the substantive stage of the TRS. Specifically, the theoretical dimensionality of trait 
reactance was not stated, thus, it is not clear whether the items of the TRS were written to 
measure specific dimensions of reactance.  
Structural stage. To date, two studies have examined the psychometric properties 
of the TRS. In the first psychometric study of the scale, Dowd et al. (1991) administered 
the 112 items to 163 college students, and then again three weeks later, with 141 
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participants at both time points. They used corrected item-total correlations (the 
correlation between each item and the sum of the remaining items on the scale), as well 
as a factor analysis to select items to be retained on the final measure. Dowd et al. (1991) 
removed 80 with corrected item-total correlations below .30. One hundred and thirty 
undergraduate students then completed the resulting 32-item questionnaire. Four 
additional items were removed following a factor analysis of the TRS responses, 
resulting in the final 28-item version of the TRS (see Appendix C). The TRS was 
administered to 130 university students.  
Dowd et al. (1991) conduced an EFA with oblique rotation to study the factor 
structure of the TRS. Four additional items with factor loadings below .35 were removed. 
It is unclear whether Dowd et al. reassessed the factor structure using only the final 28-
item version of the TRS. Nonetheless, a two-factor solution was interpreted, and the 
factors were named Behavioral Reactance (17 items, ex. “If I am told what to do, I often 
do the opposite”) and Verbal Reactance (11 items, ex. “I find that I often have to question 
authority”). The two-factor solution accounted for 26% of the total variance. Although 
Dowd et al. did not explicitly define these factors, Buboltz, Thomas, and Donnell (2002) 
observed that Behavioral Reactance seems to represent a manifestation of reactance 
through observable behaviors, whereas Verbal Reactance seems to represent a verbal 
manifestation of reactance. Upon inspection of the items, Verbal Reactance also seems to 
represent attitudes toward various reactance-inducing situations (e.g., “If I receive a 
lukewarm dish at a restaurant, I make an attempt to let that be known”). The subscales 
were moderately correlated (r = .37). Reported values of internal consistency (!) for 
Behavioral Reactance and Verbal Reactance were .81 and .75, respectively. Curiously, 
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the reliability of the total reactance score was also reported (! = .84). Test-retest 
reliability for the total score, Behavioral Reactance subscale, and Verbal Reactance 
subscale was .59, .60, and .57 respectively.  
 In the second psychometric study of the TRS, Buboltz et al. (2002) administered 
the 18-item version to 833 undergraduates. They conducted an EFA using oblique 
rotation to study the factor structure of the TRS. Oblique rotation was used to account for 
the moderate correlation between the two factors reported by Dowd et al. (1991). To 
account for the non-continuous nature of the 4-point Likert scale Buboltz et al. computed 
and analyzed polychoric correlations. A polychoric correlation estimates the correlation 
between two observed categorical variables theorized to have an underlying continuous 
normal distribution. Using several criteria (a scree plot, parallel analysis, and 
interpretability), a four-factor solution was interpreted, which accounted for 38 % of the 
total variance. Buboltz et al. (2002) noted that three items (1, 13, and 17) were removed 
due to “low” communalities. It is unclear whether the factor analysis was reanalyzed 
using the remaining 25 items. The four factors were labeled according to which items had 
salient factor loadings (" .40). Resentment of Authority (items 2, 3, 4, 10, and 12) 
represents a person’s resistance to being controlled by powerful others. Susceptibility to 
Influence (items 7, 11, 18, and 25) represents how open a person is to being influenced by 
others. Avoidance of Conflict (items 21 and 28) represents a person’s preference to avoid 
conflicts by going along with others. Preservation of Freedom (items 5, 15, 19, and 26) 
represents a person’s need to state their opinion and have things go their way. Buboltz et 
al. (2002) reported that the four factors had low correlations, ranging from .12 to .24. 
Unfortunately, reliability estimates for the four factors were not reported. Instead, 
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estimates of internal consistency (!) for the total score, the Behavioral Reactance 
subscale, and the Verbal Reactance found by Dowd et al. (1991) were computed (.65, 
.59, and .49, respectively). In other studies, the reliability of the total score was .77 
(Buboltz et al., 1999; Dowd et al., 1994) and test-retest reliability over a one-week period 
was .76 (Lukin, Dowd, Plake, & Kraft, 1985). Buboltz et al. (2002) urged researchers to 
compute subscale scores for the TRS based on the four-factor structure they championed, 
despite only reporting internal consistency estimates aligned with the two-factor solution 
championed by Dowd et al (1991). 
 There are several limitations concerning the study of the structure of the TRS. 
First, the two studies uncovered two different multidimensional factor structures. Dowd 
et al. (1991) championed a two-factor solution, whereas Buboltz et al. (2002) 
championed a four-factor solution. Thus, there is confusion surrounding the 
dimensionality of this scale. Moreover, even though a multidimensional solution was 
reported across studies, reliability estimates for the total score were nonetheless reported 
(Buboltz et al., 1999; Buboltz et al. 2001; Dowd et al., 1991; Dowd et al., 1994). As 
previously discussed, computing the total score and its reliability suggests that the two 
subscales are essentially the same and ignores the multidimensional nature of the scores. 
Furthermore, Buboltz et al. (2002) reported reliability estimates for the two subscales 
found by Dowd et al. (1991), but not for the four subscales they championed. As 
previously mentioned it appears that Dowd et al. (1991) created the TRS to measure a 
unidimensional conceptualization of trait reactance. However, the two studies 
championed different multidimensional factor structures. It is possible that these 
multidimensional solutions emerged due to similar item wording or context, rather than 
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substantively meaningful dimensions. In addition, both psychometric studies of the TRS 
removed items due to “low” factor loadings or communalities, but it appears that neither 
reanalyzed the factor structure using the remaining items. Doing so is important because 
removing items could alter the factor structure. Finally, it is important to point out that 
this scale was developed for use with a clinical population, but was studied using an 
undergraduate population. This is a concern because college students may respond 
differently to the TRS items than individuals that are currently in counseling, which was 
the intended population for this measure. 
 External stage. To provide evidence of the external validity of the TRS, Dowd et 
al. (1991) referred to an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Morgan, 1986, as cited in 
Dowd et al., 1991) that examined the relationship between psychological reactance with 
several other variables. Specifically, Morgan correlated the total and subscale TRS scores 
with a measure of locus of control, the K scale of the Minnesota Multiphastic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI, which reflects a person’s desire to be socially appropriate and impress 
other people), and several therapy-related variables (specifically, client perceptions of 
counselor expertness, trustworthiness and attractiveness, no-show rates, and length of 
treatment). Based on theory and past research, Morgan hypothesized that higher levels of 
reactance would be associated with an internal locus of control (i.e., higher scores on the 
locus of control scale) and lower scores on the K scale of the MMPI. Morgan’s first 
hypothesis was partially supported. The TRS total score and Behavioral Reactance 
subscale were positively associated with locus of control: r = .27 and r = .35 respectively. 
However, the Verbal Reactance subscale did not have a statistically significant 
correlation and consequently, was not reported by Dowd et al. (1991). The second 
51 
 
 
hypothesis was also partially supported. The K scale of the MMPI was negatively 
associated with the TRS total score and Behavioral Reactance subscale: r = -.48 and r = -
.43, respectively. Again, the correlation between the K scale and the Verbal Reactance 
subscale was not reported because it was not statistically significant. Because trait 
reactance is believed to mediate important therapy-related variables, it was hypothesized 
that reactance would be related to more no-shows and a slower rate of improvement, but 
unrelated to perceptions of counselor expertness, trustworthiness, and attractiveness. 
Morgan found that higher reactance was associated with more no-shows and a slower rate 
of improvement as measured by duration of treatment, but Dowd et al. (1991) did not 
report correlation values. In addition, there appeared to be no relationship between client 
perceptions of counselor expertness and trustworthiness (no reported correlations) and the 
TRS total and subscale scores. However, as the attractiveness of the counselor increased, 
scores on the Behavioral Reactance subscale decreased (r = -.21). To date, the four TRS 
subscales (e.g., Behavioral Reactance and Verbal Reactance) found by Dowd et al. 
(1991) have not been studied in relation to external variables. 
 Several other studies have examined the relationship between the TRS and other 
external variables, but unlike Morgan (1986, as cited in Dowd et al., 1991) did not make 
any a priori hypotheses regarding how reactance should relate to these variables. Thus, 
these studies cannot provide strong external validity evidence, but may shed light on 
variables that may be relevant to the nomological network of reactance. These studies 
took an exploratory approach to examine the possible relationships between reactance 
and measures of personality (Self-Directed Search, Buboltz et al., 1999; California 
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Psychological Inventory, Dowd et al., 1994; Personality Research Form, Dowd & 
Wallbrown, 1993) as well as developmental variables (Johnson & Buboltz, 2000).  
 Interestingly, the TRS total scores were found to positively correlate with QMPR 
total scores, with correlations ranging from .50 to .58 (Buboltz et al., 1999; Dowd et al., 
2001; Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993; Dowd et al., 1994). Thus, although the TRS and 
QMPR are both purported to measure trait reactance, they may be tapping into different 
aspects of it. This is not surprising considering that the TRS was developed for use with 
therapy clients. Nonetheless, several studies examined both scales in relation to 
personality variables, and found that the two scales produced similar personality profiles. 
The results of these studies suggest that individuals that are high in trait reactance, 
compared to individuals low in trait reactance, tend to be more aggressive and irritable, 
eager for attention, open to new experiences, independent, impulsive, easily offended, 
and lacking in sympathy, support and warmth for others (Dowd & Wallbrown). 
Moreover, people high in trait reactance were found to be more dominant and assertive, 
more interested in being themselves than making a good impression, less willing to 
follow rules and regulations, and less able to control strong emotions compared to people 
low in trait reactance (Dowd et al., 1994). Similarly, other researchers have suggested 
that those high in reactance tend to be aggressive, persuasive, domineering, independent, 
adventurous, and strive for power and status (Buboltz et al.). In addition, Buboltz et al. 
found that they also tend to dislike interpersonal interactions, ignore rules and 
regulations, and think of themselves as popular, adventurous, and ambitious.  
 Gender, age, and ethnicity differences regarding the TRS have also been explored 
by researchers. In general, males have statistically significantly higher scores on the TRS 
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than do females (Dowd et al., 1994; Goldsmith et al., 2005; Seeman, Buboltz, Jenkins, 
Soper, & Woller, 2004). In addition, it appears that reactance as measured by the TRS 
decreases as age increases (r = -.15, Goldsmith et al.; r = -.21, Dowd et al., 2001). It has 
also been hypothesized that minorities have higher reactance due to negative life 
experiences. This finding was supported. In one study, African Americans had 
significantly higher scores than Caucasians on the Behavioral and Verbal Reactance 
subscales, as well as the total TRS total score (Seeman et al., 2004). 
The Need for Additional Study of Trait Reactance Measures 
 To summarize, in order to study trait reactance in a general population, a quality 
measure is required. Three measures, the QMPR, TRS, and HPRS, were reviewed and 
evaluated. The QMPR was the first measure of trait reactance, but researchers concluded 
that it was psychometrically unsound, and recommended against using it. In response to 
this, two measures were created to improve upon the QMPR: the TRS and the HPRS. The 
TRS was developed to assess reactance in therapy clients, but was validated using college 
student samples. Furthermore, there have been only two psychometric studies of the TRS 
scale, both of which found different factor structures. For these reasons, this measure 
would not be appropriate for better understanding a normal population. The HPRS, on the 
other hand, was developed for a normally functioning population. In fact, its 
psychometric properties were examined internationally via six studies using 
undergraduates as well as samples from the general public in both Australia and the 
United States. However, because the six studies came to different conclusions regarding 
the factor structure and scoring of the HPRS, further study contributing to the structural 
stage is warranted. Moreover, there is a need for additional external validity evidence.  
  
CHAPTER 3 
Methods 
Participants 
Two independent samples of students from a mid-sized, mid-Atlantic university 
were used for this study. Both samples consisted of randomly selected students that 
participated in one of two university-wide “Assessment Days” in the fall of 2009 or 
spring of 2010. At this university, each incoming freshman is required to participate in 
Assessment Day the weekend before the start of classes in the fall, and again after they 
accumulate 45-75 credit hours. This second Assessment Day occurs in the spring, during 
students’ sophomore or junior year. Thus, one sample consisted of freshmen and the 
other, upperclassmen. It is important to note that these two samples were independent; 
that is, they consisted of different students. 
A total of 1215 participants were in the freshmen sample.  Of these students, 
approximately 64% were female, 84% were White non-Hispanic, 5% were Asian, 3.5% 
were Black, 2% were Hispanic, .1% were Native American, and 5% did not specify their 
ethnicity.  The average age was 18.43 (SD = .40). A total of 876 participants were in the 
upperclassmen sample. Approximately 65% of these students were female, 77% were 
White non-Hispanic, 7% were Asian, 3% were Black, 2.5% were Hispanic, less than 1% 
were Native American, and 9% did not specify their ethnicity.  The average age was 
20.11 (SD = .93). 
The freshmen sample was utilized to assess if Brown et al.’s (2009) results could 
be replicated. As previously mentioned, Brown et al. modified the originally 
hypothesized bifactor model in two ways: (1) removing the Independence specific factor 
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and (2) adding an Opposite specific factor. Because modified models can result in 
improved fit simply due to capitalizing on the characteristics of the particular sample 
used in the study, it was necessary that these modified models be fit to responses from 
different, independent samples (MacCallum et al., 1992). Given that Brown et al. studied 
the HPRS using a freshmen sample, an upperclassmen sample was used to evaluate the 
generalizability of the model to a slightly different population. Finally, a set of external 
variables was administered to both samples in order to collect external validity evidence. 
The procedures used for both samples are described in detail below.  
Procedure  
On Assessment Day, participants were randomly assigned to a testing room 
monitored by trained proctors, where they completed a set of six tests (both cognitive and 
noncognitive) that take approximately three hours to complete. In the current study, the 
room sizes for both Assessment Days ranged from approximately 100 to 300 students.  
After providing informed consent, participants completed a series of tests 
designed to measure content knowledge specific to the general education program (e.g., 
scientific and quantitative reasoning) as well as noncognitive characteristics and attitudes 
(e.g., personality and motivation). Tests were administered one at a time and directions 
were read to the participants before they completed each test. All participants completed 
the same test at the same time, and were only allowed to move on to the next test once 
everyone had finished the previous test. Administering the assessments in this way 
helped to ensure that participants took their time when responding to each test and 
engaged in good effort. The HPRS was the last of five tests administered for both 
samples. In addition to the HPRS, participants completed the General Conformity Scale 
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(GCS), the Big Five Inventory (BFI), and the Perceived Entitlement Scale (PES)
1
earlier 
in the testing session. 
Measures 
Hong Psychological Reactance Scale (HPRS; Hong & Page 1989) 
The HPRS is a 14-item, self-report measure that was created to assess one’s 
tendency to experience psychological reactance (i.e., trait reactance, see Appendix A for 
items). Participants were asked to respond to each statement using a scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores are indicative of higher levels of trait 
reactance.  
General Conformity Scale (GCS)  
The GCS (Santor et al., 2000) is a unidimensional, six-item, self-report measure 
that was created to assess one’s tendency to conform to authority in general. Participants 
were asked to respond to each statement using a scale of 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 
(very true of me). Two of the six items are negatively worded and are reversed scored 
before obtaining scale scores. Scale scores are computed by summing all of the items, 
with higher scores indicative of higher levels general conformity. An example item from 
the GCS is, “I usually do what I am told” (see Appendix D for items). Santor et al. 
advocated for the unidimensionality of the scale using item-total correlations, however a 
factor analytic study has yet to be conducted. Santor et al. also provided convergent and 
discriminant validity evidence of the scale. Cronbach’s alpha for the Santor et al. sample 
was .81. In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha for both samples was .82. 
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Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
The BFI (John & Srivastava, 1991) is a 44-item, multidimensional measure used 
to assess the Big Five personality traits. Specifically, there are five subscales, each with 
eight to ten items used to assess different dimensions of personality: extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experiences. Participants 
were asked to respond to each statement using a scale of 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree 
strongly). Of the 44 items on the scale, 16 items are negatively worded and thus reversed 
scored before obtaining subscale scores (see Appendix E for items). Subscale scores are 
computed by summing all of the items within the subscale; higher scores on the subscales 
are indicative of higher levels of each dimension of personality. Although the entire scale 
was administered, the current study only had specific hypotheses concerning 
relationships between reactance and the extraversion, agreeableness, and openness to 
experiences subscales. An example item from the extraversion subscale is “I see myself 
as someone who is outgoing, sociable”; and an example item from the agreeableness 
subscale is “I see myself as someone who is considerate and kind to almost everyone.” 
An example item from the openness to experience subscale is “I see myself as someone 
who is curious about many different things.” Although there are no a priori hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between reactance and the conscientiousness and neuroticism 
subscales, they will nonetheless be explored. An example item from the 
conscientiousness subscale is “I see myself as someone who makes plans and follows 
through with them”; and an example item from the neuroticism subscale is “I see myself 
as someone who is worries a lot.” Previous research examining the factor structure of the 
BFI has generally supported the five-factor structure (e.g., Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; 
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John & Srivastava) and evidence of convergent and discriminant validity with other 
scales measuring the Big Five personality traits has been collected (e.g., John & 
Srivastava, 1999). For the extraversion subscale, Cronbach’s alpha was .87 for the 
freshmen sample and .86 for the upperclassmen sample. For the agreeableness subscale, 
Cronbach’s alpha was .78 for the freshmen sample and .80 for the upperclassmen sample. 
For the conscientiousness subscale, Cronbach’s alpha was .78 for both samples. For the 
neuroticism subscale, Cronbach’s alpha was .78 for the freshmen sample and .80 for the 
upperclassmen sample. For the openness to experience subscale, Cronbach’s alpha was 
.78 for the freshmen sample and .79 for the upperclassmen sample. 
Perceived Entitlement Scale (PES)  
The PES (Campbell et al., 2004) is a unidimensional, nine-item, self-report 
measure that was created to assess one’s tendency to feel entitled in general (i.e., 
psychological entitlement). Participants were asked to respond to each statement using a 
scale of 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement). One item is negatively worded 
and is reversed scored before obtaining scale scores, which are computed by summing all 
of the items. Accordingly, higher scores are indicative of higher levels of psychological 
entitlement. An example item from the PES is, “I honestly feel I’m just more deserving 
than others” (see Appendix F for items). Campbell et al. supported the unidimensionality 
of the PES via EFA and CFA studies, and provided external validity evidence (i.e., 
convergent and discriminant validity). Cronbach’s alpha was .85 in that study. In the 
current study, Cronbach’s alpha was .87 for the freshmen sample
1
. 
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Data Analysis Procedures 
 The data analysis for this study will consist of two phases congruent with the two 
purposes of the study. In Phase 1, to study the factor structure of the HPRS, a series of 
factor models will be tested via CFA using each sample separately. Specifically, the six 
models tested by Brown et al. (2009) will be re-tested in the current study: a one-factor 
model, four-factor model, second-order model, bifactor model, incomplete bifactor 
model, and an incomplete bifactor model with the added Opposite specific factor (see 
Figures 1 and 2). Testing competing models in CFA is aligned with best practices, as 
there are often alternative models that can explain the inter-item relationships equally 
well or better than a model that is said to fit the data. Thus, pitting one’s theoretical 
model against other alternative models allows one to effectively test and possibly rule out 
alternative explanations, which can foster greater support for the championed theoretical 
model than if it had just been tested alone (Loehlin, 1998). In Phase 2, to gather external 
validity evidence for the HPRS, the relationships between the championed HPRS factor 
structure from Phase 1 and theoretically-related variables will be examined via full 
(SEM).  
Phase 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Model 1. One-factor model. The first model that was tested is the unidimensional 
model in which all 14 items represent one, overall factor of trait reactance (see Figure 1). 
In a one-factor model, the common variance among the 14 items is explained by one 
factor. This model had 77 degrees of freedom, with 28 parameters (14 direct paths, 14 
error variances) estimated from 105 observations. Estimating this model empirically tests 
whether all the items represent a unidimensional conceptualization of trait reactance (i.e., 
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whether the items are homogeneous). This was important to evaluate because, as 
previously discussed, most researchers using the HPRS calculate a total score and report 
its reliability, despite championing a multidimensional factor structure. If this 
unidimensional model represented the data well, the computation of a total score and its 
reliability would be defensible. However, based on Brown et al.’s (2009) findings, it was 
hypothesized that this one-factor model would not fit the data. If this hypothesis were 
supported, computing a composite total score and corresponding reliability (e.g., 
coefficient alpha or omega) would not be justified.  
Model 2. Four-factor model. In addition to the one-factor model, the oblique four-
factor model championed by Thomas et al. (2001) was also tested (see Figure 1). The 
four-factor model specifies that the HPRS is multidimensional, meaning that inter-item 
correlations within subsets of items (i.e., dimensions) are higher than the inter-item 
correlations across subsets of items. This model had 71 degrees of freedom, with 34 
parameters (14 direct paths, 14 error variances, 6 covariances) estimated from 105 
observations. Evaluating this model tests whether four correlated first-order factors best 
explain the relationships among the 14 items. If this model fit the data, it would not be 
appropriate to calculate a total score. Rather, the four subscale scores would need to be 
reported as a “profile” of trait reactance. In Brown et al.’s (2009) study, the four-factor 
model did not represent the data well. Thus, it was hypothesized that this model would 
not adequately represent the inter-item relationships in the current study either. 
Model 3. Second-order model. The third model evaluated was the second-order 
model, which is similar to the four-factor model, with the exception that a second-order 
factor explains the correlations among the first-order factors (see Figure 1). Thus, the key 
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element of the second-order model is that there is a hierarchy of factors, such that the 
second-order factor is superordinate (i.e., at a higher level) compared to the four first-
order factors (Gignac, 2008). The second-order model had 73 degrees of freedom, with 
32 parameters (18 direct paths, 14 error variances) estimated from 105 observations. 
Because this model is more parsimonious (i.e., has more degrees of freedom) than the 
four-factor model (which has 71 degrees of freedom), it would fit the data equally well or 
worse that the four-factor model, but not better. If the four-factor model did not fit the 
data, the second-order model would not fit the data either since it is more parsimonious 
than the four-factor model.  Because the second-order model would not converge to an 
admissible solution in Brown et al.’s (2009) study due to a negative disturbance term 
associated with the Resisting Influence from Others factor, it was hypothesized that the 
same would occur in the current study. 
Model 4. Bifactor model. The bifactor model has been primarily used by 
intelligence researchers (e. g., Gustafson & Balke, 1993), but has increasingly been 
employed to better understand noncognitive constructs (Chen et al., 2006; Gignac, 2007; 
2008; Muliak & Quartetti, 1997; Yung, Thissen, & McLeod, 1999; Reise, Morizot, & 
Hays, 2007; Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000). A bifactor model is very similar to a one-
factor model in that common variance among all the items is explained by a general 
factor. However, the bifactor model also includes specific factors that explain additional 
variance among subsets of items after controlling for the general factor (see Figure 1). To 
describe this further, imagine a correlation matrix among items in which all the item 
correlations are moderate to high and of approximately the same magnitude. In such a 
case, a one-factor model would fit the data well. Now, imagine that in addition to 
62 
 
 
moderately high correlations among the items, there are “pockets” of items with even 
higher inter-item correlations. This describes a scenario in which the bifactor model 
would explain the inter-item correlations well.  
To reiterate, the specific factors of the bifactor model explain shared variance 
among items over and above what can be accounted for by the general factor (i.e., 
controlling for the general factor); thus, the specific factors and the general factor are 
orthogonal. The specific factors are not related to the general factor because by 
definition, they represent what cannot be explained by the general factor. These specific 
factors can be substantive and meaningful, or they can represent method or nuisance 
effects (e.g., variance shared by negatively-worded items). For the current study, it is 
important to keep in mind that these specific factors do not represent dimensions of 
general trait reactance. Rather, the specific factors represent common variance shared 
among sets of items after removing variance common to the general reactance factor. 
Thus, although tempting, one should not refer to these specific factors using the same 
names applied to the first-order factors. To reinforce this idea, Brown et al. (2009) gave 
the specific factors different labels than their “respective” first order factors (e.g., Anger).  
In the current study, there were only two indicators representing the Advice 
specific factor.  Accordingly, their unstandardized factor loadings on Anger were 
constrained to be equal so that this part of the model is identified
2
 (see Figure 1). All 
other factor loadings and all error terms were freely estimated. Factor correlations were 
fixed to zero representing the orthogonal nature of the general and specific factors. The 
bifactor model had 64 degrees of freedom, with 41 parameters (27 direct paths, 14 error 
variances) being estimated from 105 observations.  
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Model 5. Incomplete bifactor model. The incomplete bifactor model (with the 
Independence specific factor removed) was also tested in the current study. This model is 
more parsimonious than the original bifactor model, and specifically tests the necessity of 
the Independence specific factor. That is, it assesses if this particular set of items shares 
variance after controlling for the general reactance factor. Testing this model assesses 
whether these items are unidimensional and only represent general trait reactance, or 
whether they are multidimensional, and need multiple factors (i.e., general and specific) 
to explain their common variance. Given Brown et al.’s (2009) results, it was 
hypothesized that this model would fit as well as the full bifactor model, thus supporting 
the removal of the Independence specific factor. However, it was also hypothesized that 
there will be local misfit associated with the three items that have “opposite” wording. 
This model had 68 degrees of freedom, with 37 parameters (23 direct paths, 14 error 
variances) being estimated from 105 observations. 
Model 6. Incomplete bifactor model with opposite specific factor. The last model 
tested was the incomplete bifactor model with an added Opposite specific factor. This 
model tests if items 3, 9, and 13 share additional variance, after controlling for reactance 
as well as their respective specific factors. As previously mentioned, this Opposite 
specific factor appears to represent a method effect due to common wording concerning 
“doing the opposite.” Another possible explanation for the inter-correlations among the 
three items is that all three items tend to be extreme (e.g., “When something is prohibited, 
I usually think, “That’s exactly what I am going to do”). This model had 65 degrees of 
freedom, with 40 parameters (26 direct paths, 14 error variance) being estimated from 
105 observations. Given that this was the model championed by Brown et al. (2009), it 
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was hypothesized that it would also adequately explain the responses of both samples in 
the current study.  
Phase 2: External Validity 
SEM was used to estimate the relationships between the external variables and 
each HPRS factor from the championed CFA model. The external variables include 
general conformity, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, 
openness to experience, and entitlement
1
. The relationship between the HPRS and 
conscientiousness and neuroticism were also explored. Relating the HPRS factors to each 
external variable within an SEM framework estimates the relationship at the latent level, 
which controls for measurement error. This is advantageous compared to relating the 
variables at the observed level (i.e., bivariate correlations) where error variance is not 
removed. Furthermore, if a bifactor model were found to best represent scores on the 
HPRS, it would not be appropriate to compute a total observed “reactance” score, as it 
would contaminate the reactance variance with specific factor variance.  Instead, the 
general reactance factor from the bifactor model (with the effects of the specific factors 
removed) would need to be related to the external variables via full SEM. In order to 
assess the external validity evidence of the HPRS, latent correlations between the 
external variable factors and the championed HPRS factor(s) were evaluated for their 
alignment with a priori hypotheses.  
  
CHAPTER 4 
Results 
Data Screening and Descriptive Statistics 
Both datasets were screened for missing data, out-of-range responsese, univariate 
and multivariate outliers (based on Mahalanobis distances), as well as univariate and 
multivariate normality before conducting any analyses. Participants with missing data, 
out-of-range responses, or atypical data (i.e., outliers) on any of the variables (including 
the external variables) were removed from the dataset.  
For the freshmen sample, a total of 1305 participants completed the HPRS and the 
external variable measures administered on Assessment Day. Of these participants, 1218 
had valid responses (i.e., no missing data or out-of-range responses) on all of the 
measures. Three cases were flagged as multivariate outliers and subsequently removed 
due to clear response sets, resulting in a final freshmen sample size of 1215 participants. 
For the upperclassmen sample, a total of 911 participants were administered the HPRS 
and the external variable measures, of which 876 had complete data on all of the 
variables under study. The final number of participants in the upperclassmen sample 
consisted of 872 participants (four multivariate outliers were removed).  
Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis, and inter-
item correlations) for the two samples are presented in Table 2. Overall, scores tended to 
fall in the middle, with means ranging from 2.08 to 3.55 for the freshmen and 1.97 to 
3.47 for the upperclassmen. All correlations were low to moderate, indicating an absence 
of multicollinearity. According to the skewness and kurtosis indices associated with the 
14 HPRS items, there did not appear to be any extreme deviation from univariate 
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normality, as there were no values greater than #2# for skewness or #7#for kurtosis for 
either sample (Finney & DiStefano, 2006).  However, the data did appear to deviate from 
multivariate normality, as Mardia’s normalized multivariate kurtosis index was 27.55 for 
the freshmen sample and 21.57 for the upperclassmen sample, which exceeds most 
recommended cutoffs (Finney & DiStefano).  
Estimation Method 
For all CFAs, a 14 X 14 covariance matrix was analyzed using LISREL 8.72 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2005). Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation was utilized to 
produce parameter estimates and fit indices. ML estimation was used instead of 
generalized least squares (GLS) because it is more sensitive to model misspecification 
(Olsson, Foss, Troye, & Howell, 2000).  However, because the assumption of 
multivariate normality was violated, it was necessary to utilize the Satorra-Bentler (SB) 
scaling method (Satorra & Bentler, 1994).  The SB scaling method uses the degree of 
multivariate kurtosis present in the data to adjust the #
2
 statistic, several fit indices, and 
the standard errors of the estimated parameters so that they are less biased.  
Assessing Model-Data Fit 
How well each hypothesized model fit the data was evaluated in several ways. 
First, the global (overall) fit of the model was assessed. Although there are numerous fit 
indices that provide information regarding overall fit, most fall into one of two 
categories: absolute or incremental fit indices. Absolute fit indices represent how well the 
model-implied covariance matrix aligns with the observed covariance matrix. In the 
current study, three absolute fit indices were examined: the SB-scaled chi-square (#
2
SB), 
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the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), and the SB-scaled root mean error 
of approximation (RMSEASB).  
The #
2
SB statistically tests the fit of the model to the data. Specifically, it tests the 
null hypothesis that the model-implied covariance matrix is equal to the observed 
covariance matrix. Because one hopes that the model adequately reproduces the observed 
covariances and variances, failure to reject the null hypothesis lends support for the fit of 
the theoretical model to the data. However, this test is affected by sample size such that 
large samples can lead to increased Type I errors in which the null is rejected due to 
trivial differences between the two covariance matrices. Moreover, it is a test of exact, as 
opposed to approximate, fit. However, making a dichotomous decision regarding the fit 
of a model may not be entirely useful (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). Nonetheless, the #
2
 
test is still commonly reported out of convention.  
Another index of absolute fit is the SRMR, which reflects the average absolute 
value of the correlation residuals. Thus, lower values are indicative of better fit. Hu and 
Bentler (1999) recommended this index always be reported because it is most sensitive to 
misspecified factor covariances, moderately sensitive to misspecified factor loadings, and 
is minimally affected by distribution and sample size.  
The RMSEASB reflects the discrepancy between the model-implied covariance 
matrix and the population covariance matrix (i.e., error of approximation). This index is 
adjusted for parsimony such that it “rewards” parsimonious models (i.e., models with 
more degrees of freedom). Furthermore, this index is recommended because it is most 
sensitive to misspecified pattern coefficients, relatively unaffected by the estimation 
method used except in small samples, and less sensitive to sample size and non-normality 
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compared other fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Because the RMSEASB is a measure of 
the discrepancy between the model-implied and population covariance matrices, values 
close to zero are desirable.  
 Although absolute fit indices such as the ones described above are useful in 
understanding how well the theoretical model reproduces the covariance matrix, it is 
important to note that a model can have good absolute fit due to low correlations among 
the observed variables. That is, low correlations are somewhat easy to reproduce and will 
often result in absolute fit indices that appear to be adequate (Hu & Bentler, 1998). 
Incremental fit indices, on the other hand, are sensitive to low correlations. Specifically, 
incremental fit indices assess the relative improvement in fit of a theoretical model 
compared to a baseline (null) model in which all of the observed variables are 
uncorrelated. That is, if there are substantial inter-item correlations and the theoretical 
model adequately represents them, then the theoretical model should fit substantially 
better than the null model. The SB-scaled comparative fit index (CFISB) is a ratio of the 
lack of fit of the theoretical model to the lack of fit of the baseline model, subtracted from 
1. Because one would hope that the theoretical model fits substantially better than the 
baseline model, one would also hope that the lack of fit associated with the theoretical 
model is much less than that of the baseline model, making their ratio very small. Thus, 
CFI values close to 1 are preferred.  
Guidelines to evaluate the magnitude of these fit indices have been developed (Hu 
& Bentler, 1998; 1999). For example, Hu and Bentler suggest that for normally 
distributed data, adequate fit is evidenced by SRMR values less than .08, RMSEA values 
less than .06, and CFI values greater than .95. For non-normal data, the Satorra-Bentler 
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scaled fit indices have slightly different “cutoffs”. According to Yu and Muthén (2002), 
SRMR values less than .07, RMSEA values less than .05, and CFI values greater than .95 
are indicative of good fit. It is important to note that the use of cutoffs to evaluate fit 
indices has been debated in the literature. Specifically, Marsh et al. (2004) questioned Hu 
and Bentler’s (1999) logic of establishing cutoffs to make dichotomous decisions 
regarding fit. They argued that the original purpose of goodness-of-fit indices was to 
evaluate approximate fit, not to make dichotomous decisions regarding whether the 
model fits perfectly (which is what the #
2 
statistic tests). Thus, using a hypothesis testing 
paradigm to establish cutoffs is questionable because it forces the researcher to make a 
dichotomous decision regarding the fit of a model when the real goal is to assess the 
degree of fit. Accordingly, it is recommended that these cutoffs be interpreted as 
guidelines rather than strict cutoffs (Marsh et al.). In line with this recommendation, the 
guidelines established by Yu and Muthén for non-normal data (i.e., SRMR < .07, 
RMSEASB < .05, CFISB > .95) will be used as the “upper-bound” of fit in the current 
study. Furthermore, a model will be judged to have adequate fit if it reaches the cut-offs 
commonly used by researchers prior to the more stringent cutoffs suggested by Hu and 
Bentler (SRMR < .08, RMSEASB < .08, CFISB > .90). Table 3 contains the global fit 
indices associated with each model.  
Although global fit indices can be informative for evaluating how well a model 
fits the data in general, they can mask areas of “local” misfit. Examining how well the 
model reproduces covariances between individual pairs of items is useful for diagnosing 
local misfit, and can be evaluated by examining the standardized covariance residuals. 
Specifically, standardized covariance residuals represent the discrepancy between each 
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model-implied inter-item covariance and the corresponding observed inter-item 
covariance. Thus, values close to zero are preferred. Because standardized covariance 
residuals are on a z-score metric, values greater than #4# signify that the model did not 
adequately reproduce the relationship between the two items. Positive residuals indicate 
that the relationship was underestimated, whereas negative residuals indicate that the 
relationship was overestimated. 
Sample 1: Freshmen Sample 
Phase 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Model-data fit. The fit indices associated with each model appear in Table 3. As 
suspected, the one-factor model (Model 1) did not represent the data well globally or 
locally (21 areas of local misfit). Importantly, the pattern of standardized covariance 
residuals aligned with Brown et al.’s (2009) championed bifactor model (Model 6). For 
example, the largest residual (9.60) was between two items (6 and 8) representing the 
Anger specific factor in Model 6, indicating that after controlling for the general 
reactance factor, these two items share additional variance not explained by the one-
factor model. The relationship between two items representing the Opposite specific 
factor of Model 6 (3 and 9) was also underestimated, as were the relationships between 
various items representing the Rules and Regulations and Anger specific factors.  
Because Model 2 is a multidimensional model, it was better able to represent the 
relationships among items than the simpler Model 1.  Although the four-factor model 
(Model 2) reproduced the data fairly well in a global sense, there were eight areas of local 
misfit. The pattern of standardized covariance residuals still aligned with Model 6. Recall 
that in Model 2, there is not an overall factor to represent the common variance across all 
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14 items. The relationships between several items representing different factors (e.g., 1 
and 4, 5 and 7, 13 and 14) were underestimated, suggesting the need for an overall 
reactance factor to help account for these relationships. Thus, these data appear to need 
both an overall general factor, as well as several specific factors to adequately represent 
the inter-item relationships.   
As was found by Brown et al. (2009), the second-order model (Model 3) did not 
converge to an admissible solution due to a negative disturbance term (Heywood Case) 
associated with the Resisting Influence from Others factor. The negative disturbance term 
suggests that the Resisting Influence from Others items only represent the second-order 
factor. Thus, the data appear to be over-factored when modeling this first-order factor 
(Chen et al., 2006). As with Model 3, the bifactor model (Model 4) also did not converge 
to an admissible solution due to a negative error variance associated with the 
Independence specific factor. Because the same items (10, 11, 12, and 13) that 
represented the Resisting Influence from Others first-order factor in Model 3 represented 
the Independence specific factor in Model 4, it appears that these items are being over-
factored in both models. Taken together, this suggests that these items are 
unidimensional; that is, they do not share any additional variance with each other after 
controlling for general reactance.  
When the Independence specific factor was removed to form the incomplete 
bifactor model (Model 5), it resulted in adequate global fit, but there were 11 areas of 
local misfit. In particular, the relationship between items 3 and 9 remained 
underestimated, highlighting the need of the Opposite specific factor specified by Model 
6. The Opposite specific factor was added, however, this model (Model 6) would not 
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converge to an admissible solution. In order to explore why this model did not converge 
to an admissible solution, the errors of the three Opposite items (3, 9, and 13) were 
allowed to correlate. The error correlations between item 13 and both items 3 and 9 were 
minimal (.08 and .02, respectively), indicating that after controlling for the general 
reactance factor, item 13 did not share additional variance with either item 3 or 9, 
resulting in the Opposite factor being empirically under-identified. Thus, a modified 
version of Model 6 in which item 13 did not represent the Opposite specific factor was 
tested (Model 6-revised). Because the Opposite factor subsequently has only two 
indicators, the two factor pattern coefficients were constrained to be equal, as was done 
with the Advice specific factor in Model 4
2
. This model has 67 degrees of freedom, with 
38 parameters (24 direct paths, 14 error variances) estimated from 105 observations. 
Model 6-revised resulted in adequate global fit, but had six areas of local misfit.  These 
areas of local misfit were not severe, however, with all of the standardized covariance 
residuals falling between -5.69 and 5.25. Furthermore, there reasons for these areas of 
local misfit were not obvious; that is, they were not easily explainable. Given that the 
local misfit appears to be mild, this modified version of Model 6 was championed for the 
freshmen sample. 
Parameter estimates and reliabilities. Given the adequate fit of the incomplete 
bifactor model with the Opposite specific factor (Model 6-revised), the pattern 
coefficients and error terms from this model were examined (see Table 4).  This bifactor 
model includes items that represent only one factor (i.e., unidimensional items) as well as 
items that represent multiple factors (i.e., multidimensional items).  For unidimensional 
items (such as item 10), an unstandardized pattern coefficient represents the amount of 
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change in an item for every one standard deviation increase in the underlying factor, 
whereas a standardized pattern coefficient represents the standard deviation change in the 
item for every one standard deviation increase in the factor. Furthermore, the squared 
standardized pattern coefficient represents the amount of variance in an item that can be 
explained by the latent factor. For example, item 10 only represents the general reactance 
factor, and has a standardized pattern coefficient of .63, meaning that for every one 
standard deviation increase in the factor, the item increases by .63 standard deviations, 
and approximately 40% of the variance in item 10 can be explained by the general 
reactance factor (.63
2
 = .40).  Ideally, at least 50% of the variance in an item would be 
explained by the underlying factor structure.   
The interpretation of parameter estimates is slightly different for 
multidimensional items (such as item 4). An unstandardized pattern coefficient represents 
the unit change in an item for every standard deviation increase in the underlying factor, 
controlling for the other underlying factors. Likewise, a standardized pattern coefficient 
represents the standard deviation change in an item for every one standard deviation 
increase in the factor, controlling for the other underlying factors. For example, item 4 
represents both general reactance, as well as Anger. The standardized pattern coefficient 
of item 4 on the general reactance factor is .41, indicating that for every standard 
deviation increase in general reactance, item 4 increases by .41 standard deviations, 
controlling for Anger. Because all factors in the championed model are orthogonal, the 
total variance explained (R
2
) for any particular item is simply the sum of the squared 
standardized loadings of its associated factors. For example, the standardized factor 
loading of item 4 on Anger is .27, so approximately 24% the variance in item 4 can be 
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explained by the general reactance factor and the Anger specific factor together (.41
2
 + 
.27
2
 = .24). Standardized pattern coefficients can also be used to compare the relative 
strength of factors in explaining variance in each item. Because the HPRS is 
hypothesized to be primarily a measure of general reactance, it is preferable for items to 
have higher standardized pattern coefficients on the general reactance factor than on their 
respective specific factors.  
After inspecting the parameter estimates associated with Model 6-revised, several 
important patterns emerged. First, all of the unstandardized pattern coefficients were 
statistically significant (p < .05). Second, all of the items had higher standardized pattern 
coefficients associated with the general reactance factor than with their associated 
specific factor(s), with the exception of item 6. The larger coefficients associated with the 
general factor are an important finding, considering that this scale was most likely 
designed to measure reactance in general.  Third, only two items (3 and 6) had more than 
50% of their variance explained by the factor structure, indicating that most items still 
have a large amount of unexplained variance.  
An additional way to assess the utility of the championed model is to calculate 
Coefficient H for the general reactance factor. Coefficient H represents the reliability of a 
latent factor (Hancock & Mueller, 2001), and is a sum of each item’s information, 
calculated using the following formula: 
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A useful way to conceptualize Coefficient H is to imagine regressing the latent factor on 
its indicators. Coefficient H is equivalent to the variance in the latent factor (R
2
) 
attributable to an “optimum linear composite” of its indicators (Hancock & Mueller). 
Coefficient H for the freshmen sample was .854. Thus, the 14 items of the HPRS explain 
85.4% of the variance in the general reactance latent factor.  Coefficient H can also be 
calculated for each of the specific factors, using only their associated indicators. For the 
specific factors, Coefficient H was .38 for Rules and Regulations, .55 for Anger, .24 for 
Opposite, and .34 for Advice. These values are low, indicating that the specific factors 
may not be meaningful on their own. That is, the items do not seem to adequately 
“inform” the specific factors. 
Phase 2: External Validity Evidence 
Relationships with the general reactance factor. In order to collect external 
validity evidence for the HPRS and assess its nomological network, the general reactance 
factor was correlated with seven external variables (general conformity, extraversion, 
agreeableness, openness to experiences, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and 
psychological entitlement). This was conducted at the latent level for two reasons: (1) it 
allows one to take measurement error into account, and (2) it allows one control for 
construct irrelevant variance due to the specific factors. With respect to the former, each 
external variable was modeled as a latent factor by using a single composite indicator and 
fixing its error variance, based on its reliability (see Figure 6).  The composite variable 
was created by summing the items representing that particular scale or subscale. Of 
course, using a single indicator assumes that a unidimensional structure underlies the 
measure’s scores. The unidimensionality of each of these scales has been empirically 
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supported (see Methods Section); thus, the use of single-indicator models was justified.  
The error variance of each composite was calculated using the following equation: 
! 
1" r
xx( ) # var(x) , where rxx is Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and var(x) is the variance of 
the total composite scores. When modeling this via SEM, the unstandardized error 
variance of the composite indicator was fixed to this value. The latent factor representing 
the external variable was then allowed to freely correlate with the reactance general 
factor and the specific factors. 
 Factor correlations with the external variables are presented in Table 5. As 
predicted, trait reactance had a positive relationship with entitlement (r = .25, p < .01) 
and negative relationships with conformity (r = -.46, p < .01) and agreeableness (r = -.43, 
p < .01). Contrary to what was predicted, trait reactance did not have a significant 
positive relationship with extraversion or openness to experience. Although no specific 
hypothesis was made regarding the relationship between trait reactance and 
conscientiousness, the two constructs were negatively correlated (r = -.25, p < .01).  
Although no hypotheses regarding the relationship between neuroticism and trait 
reactance were stated, there was no observed relationship between these two constructs (r 
= .08, p > .05). Thus, highly reactant individuals tend to be more entitled, less willing to 
conform, and less agreeable in general, compared to those low on this construct. There is 
also preliminary evidence to suggest that reactant individuals may also be less 
conscientious than those that are less reactant. There was no previous research linking 
these two constructs, but it is not surprising that individuals that are more reactant, more 
entitled, less willing to conform, and less agreeable would also be less conscientious. 
Furthermore, past research has found that those high in trait reactance tend to be 
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somewhat careless about duties and obligations, resist rules and regulations, and are not 
as interested in making a good impression as being themselves (Dowd et al., 1994). It is 
important to examine this hypothesis with the upperclassmen sample to see if the 
negative relationship between trait reactance and conformity replicates.  
Relationships with specific factors. In addition to examining the factor 
correlations with the general reactance factor, the relationships between external 
variables and the specific factors were also explored (see Table 5). Because the specific 
factors were orthogonal to the general reactance factor, the following correlations 
represent the unique relationship between the specific factors and external variables. In 
other words, the squared correlations represent variance in the external variables 
attributable to the specific factors, not the general reactance factor. The Rules and 
Regulations specific factor was negatively correlated with conformity (r = -.45, p < .01), 
agreeableness (r = -.33, p < .01), and conscientiousness (r = -.29, p < .01); the Advice 
specific factor was also negatively correlated with agreeableness (r = -.37, p < .01) and 
positively correlated with neuroticism (r = .18, p < .01); the Opposite specific factor was 
negatively correlated with conformity (r = -.46, p < .01) and conscientiousness (r = -.19, 
p < .01); and the Anger specific factor was not statistically significantly correlated with 
any of the external variables. The fact that the specific factors correlate with some of the 
external variables indicates that the HPRS represents multiple sources of systematic 
variance. The majority of this systematic variance is due to the general factor, trait 
reactance. The specific factors are also associated with systematic variance, but their low 
reliabilities limit their usefulness. Perhaps the specific factors are best conceptualized as 
method effects that are substantive, but can wreak havoc on correlations between 
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reactance and external variables, if not controlled for by using a bifactor model. 
Furthermore, without removing these unwanted sources of systematic variance, there 
would be a large amount of construct-irrelevant variance contaminating the observed 
HPRS scores. Thus, in order to obtain a purified measure of trait reactance using the 
HPRS, it appears that the use of a bifactor model (Model 6-revised) is necessary. 
Sample 2: Upperclassmen Sample 
 As previously stated, an upperclassmen sample was used to determine if the same 
factor structure would be championed in a slightly different population of 
undergraduates. In addition, it was important to test a new hypothesis derived from the 
results from the freshmen sample: that reactance and conscientiousness have a negative 
relationship. 
Phase 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Model-data fit. The fit indices associated with each model appear in Table 3. As 
with the freshmen sample, the one-factor model (Model 1) did not represent the data well 
globally or locally, with 14 areas of local misfit that aligned Brown et al.’s (2009) 
championed bifactor model (Model 6). For example, the largest residual (7.83) was 
between two items (6 and 7) that represent the Anger specific factor in Model 6.  
Furthermore, the relationships among three items representing the Rules specific factor of 
Model 6 (1, 2, and 3) were also consistently underestimated.  
The four-factor model (Model 2) fit well globally, but had two areas of local 
misfit. Specifically, the relationships between items 5 and 7, as well as 12 and 14 were 
underestimated (residuals = 4.47 and 4.58, respectively).  As with the freshmen sample, 
the pattern of standardized covariance residuals aligned with Model 6 such that both 
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residuals were between items representing different factors. This suggests the need for an 
general reactance factor to help account for these relationships.  
The second-order model (Model 3) did not converge to an admissible solution due 
to a negative disturbance term (Heywood Case) associated with the Resisting Influence 
from Others factor, which also occurred with the freshmen sample. Likewise, the bifactor 
model (Model 4) did not converge to an admissible solution due to a negative error 
variance associated with the Independence specific factor. As pointed out above, the 
same items that represented the Resisting Influence from Others first-order factor in 
Model 3 also represented the Independence specific factor in Model 4, indicating that 
these items are being over-factored in both models for the upperclassmen sample.  
The incomplete bifactor model in which the Independence specific factor was 
removed (Model 5) resulted in adequate global fit, but there were 3 areas of local misfit, 
again between items represented by different specific factors. Specifically, the 
relationships between two items on the Anger specific factor (items 6 and 8) and item 9 
on the Advice specific factor were overestimated (residuals = -4.44 and -5.42, 
respectively), and the relationship between items 6 (of Anger) and 10 (which only 
represented the general reactance factor) was underestimated (residual = 4.29). Although 
this pattern of standardized residuals does not highlight the need of the Opposite specific 
factor contained in Model 6 per se, adding this specific factor did result in better global 
fit, and there was only one area of local misfit between items 8 and 9, which was quite 
minor (residual = -4.84). Thus, Model 6 was championed for the upperclassmen sample. 
Parameter estimates and reliabilities. Given the adequate fit of the incomplete 
bifactor model with the Opposite specific factor (Model 6), the pattern coefficients and 
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error terms of this model were examined (see Table 4). After inspecting the parameter 
estimates associated with this model, the same three patterns that emerged for the 
freshman sample were also present in the results from the upperclassmen sample: (1) all 
of the unstandardized path coefficients were statistically significant (p < .05), (2) all of 
the items had higher standardized path coefficients associated with the general reactance 
factor than with their associated specific factor(s), with the exception of items 3, 4, 5, and 
6, and (3) only three items (3, 6, and 9) had more than 50% of their variance explained by 
the factor structure, indicating that most items still have a large amount of unexplained 
variance. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the pattern coefficients associated 
with the Opposite specific factor were all statistically significant and of a moderate 
magnitude, suggesting that even though the pattern of standardized covariance residuals 
from Model 5 did not suggest the need for the specific factor, it is still necessary to 
include this factor in the model. 
Coefficient H for the upperclassmen sample was .847, indicating that the 14 items 
of the HPRS explain 84.7% of the variance in the latent factor of general reactance.  For 
the specific factors, Coefficient H was .48 for Rules and Regulations, .56 for Anger, .25 
for Opposite, and .44 for Advice. These low Coefficient H values indicate that the 
specific factors may not be meaningful on their own and do not seem to adequately 
“inform” the specific factors. 
Phase 2: External Validity Evidence 
Relationships with the general reactance factor. The general reactance factor was 
correlated at the latent level with six external variables (general conformity, extraversion, 
agreeableness, openness to experiences, conscientiousness, and neuroticism). Factor 
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correlations with the external variables are presented in Table 5. As predicted, trait 
reactance had negative relationships with conformity (r = -.46, p < .01), agreeableness (r 
= -.37, p < .01), and conscientiousness (r = -.29, p < .01), and a positive relationship with 
openness to experiences (r = .17, p < .01). Contrary to what was predicted, trait reactance 
did not have a significant positive relationship with extraversion. In fact, it had a 
significant negative relationship with extraversion (r = -.19, p < .01). In addition, 
although no relationship between trait reactance and neuroticism was explicitly 
hypothesized, the two constructs were positively correlated (r = .17, p < .01) for the 
upperclassmen sample. Thus, the data from the upperclassmen sample suggest that highly 
reactant individuals tended to be less willing to conform, less agreeable, and less 
conscientious and more open to experiences in general, compared to those with low 
levels of trait reactance. This data also suggests that reactant individuals may be more 
neurotic and less extraverted, though the magnitudes of these correlations were quite 
small.  
Relationships with specific factors. In addition to examining the factor 
correlations with the general reactance factor, the relationships between external 
variables and the specific factors were also explored (see Table 5). The Rules and 
Regulations specific factor was negatively correlated with conformity (r = -.41, p < .01), 
agreeableness (r = -.45, p < .01), and conscientiousness (r = -.33, p < .01) and positively 
related to extraversion (r = .25, p < .01); the Advice specific factor was also negatively 
correlated with agreeableness (r = -.40, p < .01) and positively correlated with 
neuroticism (r = .15, p < .01); the Opposite specific factor was positively correlated with 
agreeableness (r = -.31, p < .01); and the Anger specific factor was positively correlated 
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with extraversion (r = .19, p < .01), conscientiousness (r = .17, p < .01), and openness to 
experiences (r = .29, p < .01). Again, these correlations indicate that the HPRS items 
represent multiple sources of systematic variance, not just variance due to trait reactance. 
Thus, without removing these unwanted sources of systematic variance, a large amount 
of construct-irrelevant variance would contaminate observed HPRS scores.  
Implications of Using the Championed Bifactor Model in Practice 
Advantages of the Bifactor Model 
The championed factor structure entails modeling a general reactance factor and 
several specific factors. Modeling responses on the HPRS using a bifactor model is 
advantageous for several reasons. First, as previously mentioned, SEM allows for 
constructs to be modeled at the latent level, which takes measurement error into account. 
Without controlling for measurement error, the observed correlations between reactance 
and external variables would be attenuated.  Second, modeling the inter-item 
relationships of the HPRS using a bifactor model allows one to partial out the effects of 
construct irrelevant variance by modeling specific factors. Without removing these 
sources of construct irrelevant variance, the relationships between reactance and external 
variables could be biased. The advantages of the championed bifactor model are 
highlighted below via a demonstration in which the HPRS and external variables are 
correlated using three different methods. 
 To illustrate the effects of not controlling for measurement error or construct 
irrelevant variance, the scores on the HPRS were correlated with the external variables 
using two alternative methods.  One method (Method I) computed correlations between 
the HPRS total scores and total scores on external variables (i.e., Pearson product 
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moment correlations).  The other method (Method II) correlated the latent general 
reactance factor (assuming a unidimensional model) with the latent external variables. 
Method II is an improvement over Method I because it takes the measurement error of 
both reactance and the external variables into account, allowing for correlations to be 
disattenuated. However, neither Method I nor II controls for construct irrelevant variance; 
that is, the assumed (Method I) or specified (Method II) unidimensional factor structure 
of reactance is wrong. To illustrate the advantages of the bifactor model, both of these 
methods were compared to the correlations obtained using the bifactor model (Method 
III), which controls for both measurement error and construct irrelevant variance. Table 6 
contains the correlations obtained via these three methods.  
 An examination of the correlations presented in Table 6 reveals several important 
effects. First, a comparison of the correlations obtained when using observed versus 
latent variables (Method I vs. Method II, respectively) clearly reveals the predicted 
effects of measurement error. Specifically, virtually all of the observed correlations 
between the external variables and the HPRS (Method I) are smaller than their respective 
latent correlations (Method II) for both samples. More interesting is the comparison of 
Method II (which only controls for measurement error) to Method III (which controls for 
both measurement error and construct irrelevant variance via the bifactor model). For 
both samples, the correlations of reactance with conformity, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness are noticeably smaller when estimated using Method III vs. Method II. 
Inspection of the correlations between the specific factors and these external variables 
sheds light on this finding (see Table 5). For example, in the freshman sample, the 
correlation between conformity and trait reactance, as represented by a one-factor model, 
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is -.57. This correlation drops to -.46 when correlating conformity with the purified 
general reactance factor (Model 6-revised). The latent correlation from the 
unidimensional reactance model was overestimated in Method II most likely because the 
Opposite and Rules and Regulations specific factors both have negative relationships 
with conformity.  That is, the shared variance between conformity and the Opposite and 
Rules and Regulations factors confound the shared variance between trait reactance and 
conformity when Opposite and Rules and Regulations are not modeled as separate 
factors. On the other hand, the relationship between entitlement and reactance remains 
approximately the same in magnitude from Method II to Method III. The stability in the 
magnitude of the correlation from Method II to Method III is likely due to the fact that 
none of the specific factors have a significant relationship with entitlement. Thus, this 
relationship was neither over-, nor underestimated when using the one-factor model. This 
demonstration clearly shows that when sources of systematic variance (represented by the 
specific factors) are not controlled for, they biased the correlation between reactance and 
extraversion upward (i.e., less negative).  
Scoring of the HPRS 
Although the bifactor model clearly represents the data most accurately, it 
complicates the creation of an observed composite score of reactance. One might 
erroneously conclude that because there is an overall general reactance factor, calculating 
a total score on the HPRS would be appropriate.  The negative implications of ignoring 
sources of systematic variance was illustrated above. By partialling out the variance 
attributable to Anger, Rules and Regulations, Advice, and Opposite, the general reactance 
factor is a purified measure of trait reactance. Unfortunately, there is not a clear-cut way 
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to obtain and model observed scores representing this purified reactance factor; SEM is 
necessary. 
 If one were to insist on using a total HPRS score, one could evaluate how well it 
represents the purified reactance factor by calculating "H. "H is a reliability index 
equivalent to the squared correlation between the observed total scores on the HPRS and 
the general reactance factor from the bifactor model
3
 (McDonald, 1999; Zinbarg, Revelle, 
Yovel, 2007; Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005). Specifically, "H is the ratio of 
systematic variance due only to the general reactance factor (not including variance 
attributable to the specific factors) to the total variance in the items:  
! 
"H =
#i
REACTANCE
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
#i
REACTANCE
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
+ #i
ANGER
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
+ #i
RULES
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
+ #i
OPPOSITE
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
+ #i
ADVICE
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
+ var(Ei)
i=1
p
$
, where 
$ represents the unstandardized factor loadings and var(Ei) represents the error variances 
of each item. For the current study, "H was .793 for the freshmen sample and .768 for the 
upperclassmen sample
4
.  Although approximately 78-79% of the variance in total HPRS 
scores is attributable to the general reactance factor (which is a considerable amount of 
overlap), it is important to keep in mind that the total observed score does not take 
measurement error nor construct irrelevant variance into account.  As illustrated above, 
not controlling for these two sources of variance can bias estimates of the relationship 
between trait reactance and other external variables. Thus, it is clearly preferred to model 
responses on the HPRS using the championed bifactor model within an SEM framework. 
  
CHAPTER 5 
Discussion 
 Numerous researchers have used the HPRS as a measure trait reactance, but have 
scored it in a variety of ways. For example, most researchers computed a total score for 
the HPRS (e.g., Hong, 1990; Hong et al., 2001; Joubert, 1990, 1992; Shen & Dillard, 
2005), and some researchers also computed four subscale scores (e.g., Hong & Faedda, 
1996).  These variations in scoring are most likely due to the conflicting conclusions 
obtained from psychometric studies of the scale, as well as a lack of theory regarding the 
dimensionality of trait reactance. As a result of these inconsistencies in scoring, any 
external validity evidence collected in support of the scale is questionable. Given the 
confusion regarding the factor structure and scoring of the HPRS, as well as the limited 
external validity evidence, the purpose of the current study was to further investigate the 
construct validity of the HPRS using Benson’s (1998) framework. Specifically, the 
current study focused on the last two stages of this processes. First, the dimensionality of 
the HPRS was further investigated to inform Benson’s structural stage of construct 
validation. Then, the relationships between the championed HPRS factor structure and 
theoretically related external variables were examined to gather external validity evidence 
for Benson’s external stage. The results and implications of the current study are 
discussed below. 
Structural Stage: CFA Results 
In an attempt to replicate Brown et al.’s (2009) investigation of the factor 
structure of the HPRS, the current study tested the same six models with two independent 
samples of undergraduates. As expected, Models 1 through 5 did not adequately represent 
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the data in either sample. Interestingly, the pattern of residuals associated with the one-
factor model suggested the need for several specific factors, whereas the pattern of 
residuals associated with the four-factor model suggested the need for an overall 
reactance factor. Thus, for both samples, a general reactance factor as well as several 
specific factors were required to adequately represent the responses to the HPRS. When 
the second-order model and original bifactor model were tested, they failed to converge 
to an admissible solution in both samples.  Both models appeared to have over-factored 
the data by modeling a factor to represent the shared variance among items 10 through 
13. The failure of either model to converge to an admissible solution suggests that these 
items only represent the overall general reactance factor. That is, the Resisting Influence 
from Others factor from the second-order model and the Independence specific factor 
from the bifactor model are not needed to represent the interitem correlations.  
The incomplete bifactor model (with the Independence factor removed) had 
adequate global fit, but had several areas of local misfit in both samples. For the 
freshmen sample, there were 11 areas of local misfit, and the pattern seemed to highlight 
the need for the Opposite specific factor (there was a large residual between items 3 and 
9). When this Opposite specific factor was added for the freshmen sample (Model 6), the 
model did not converge to an admissible solution.  The Opposite factor was empirically 
under-identified because item 13 did not share any additional variance with items 3 or 9 
after controlling for the general reactance factor. Thus, item 13 was not specified as an 
indicator of the Opposite specific factor (Model 6-revised). This model was championed 
for the freshmen sample. For the upperclassmen sample, on the other hand, there were 
only three areas of local misfit associated with the incomplete bifactor model that were 
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not easily explained and did not indicate the need for the Opposite specific factor. 
However, when Model 6 (with the Opposite specific factor added) was fit to the 
upperclassmen sample, the model fit well globally and locally. Although the pattern of 
residuals did not suggest the need for the Opposite specific factor, the improvement in 
local fit and the significant relationships between the Opposite factor and items 3, 9 and 
13 suggested that this factor is nonetheless needed in the model. Despite the slight 
inconsistencies across the two samples regarding the Opposite specific factor, there is 
evidence to indicate that the results from the two samples were highly congruent overall. 
Moreover, an examination of Table 4 reveals that the unstandardized pattern coefficients 
are very similar across the two samples. The largest difference between the two samples 
was minor (0.14), and the rest of the unstandardized pattern coefficients were within .10 
of each other. In addition, the results of the current study also align with Brown et al.’s 
(2009) findings. Taken together, these results support modeling the HPRS using an 
incomplete bifactor model with an Opposite specific factor.  
For both samples, the construct reliability (Coefficient H) of the general reactance 
factor was high (approximately .85), suggesting that the 14 items adequately “informed” 
or “saturated” the latent factor of reactance. Construct reliability for the specific factors, 
however, were quite low across both samples, ranging from .24 to .56. These low 
reliabilities indicate that the specific factors are not meaningful on their own. That is, if a 
researcher is interested in measuring a construct represented to some extent by a specific 
factor, it is suggested that a high quality scale created to measure the construct be used 
instead of the specific factor. For example, the Anger specific factor may measure anger 
to some extent, but given the low construct reliability of this factor, if one wanted to 
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study anger it would make more sense to administer a scale specifically designed to 
measure anger, rather than trying to represent anger with the specific factor from the 
HPRS bi-factor model.  
By investigating the dimensionality of the HPRS, the current study contributes to 
our understanding of trait reactance by informing the substantive stage of construct 
validation. As previously discussed, whether psychological reactance is unidimensional 
or multidimensional was never clearly articulated in the literature. In particular, the 
current study illustrates that the HPRS is a unidimensional construct, but can become 
multidimensional when it is operationalized via the HPRS. This is most likely because 
trait reactance is a conceptually broad construct that requires a diverse set of items to 
adequately represent its breadth (Reise et al., 2007). An examination of the HPRS items 
(Appendix A) reveals that this scale contains sets of items to assess various aspects of 
reactance. These sets of context-specific itmes could explain why a four-factor solution 
emerged during the EFAs conducted by Hong and colleagues. Reise et al. noticed that  
It is challenging to determine whether an item set is multidimensional because 
there are relatively independent substantive dimensions that affect item variance, 
or whether additional factors are due to a ‘bloated specific’ emerging due to the 
semantic similarity among a subset of the items (p. 21).  
The current study is able to provide insight into this matter, with regard to the HPRS. 
Given that the construct reliability was high for the general factor and low for the specific 
factors, there is strong evidence suggesting that the HPRS measures a substantively broad 
conceptualization of trait reactance, and that the specific factors are really “bloated 
specifics.” That is, Anger, Rules and Regulations, Opposite, and Advice are trivial factors 
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that only emerged because of similarities in item wording. Hence, they are not 
meaningful distinct dimensions of trait reactance as previously suggested by the four-
factor solution championed by Hong and colleagues. Rather, trait reactance is a 
conceptually broad unidimensional construct that, when operationalized, is 
multidimensional due to similar item phrasing. Utilizing the bifactor model allows 
researchers to isolate the general factor of reactance, which is of most interest, while 
partialling out the nuisance effects of the specific factors.  
External Stage: Relationships with External Variables 
 External validity evidence for the championed incomplete bifactor model with the 
Opposite specific factor was collected by examining relationships with seven external 
variables: general conformity, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, openness to experience, and entitlement
1
. It was originally hypothesized that 
trait reactance would be positively associated with extraversion, openness to experience, 
and entitlement, and negatively associated with general conformity and agreeableness. 
However, after finding a positive relationship between reactance and conscientiousness 
with the freshmen sample (which made logical sense), a positive relationship between 
these two variables was then hypothesized for the upperclassmen sample.  
The hypotheses that reactance is negatively related to general conformity, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness was supported, with moderate to strong negative 
relationships across both samples. In addition, the hypothesis that reactance is positively 
associated with entitlement was supported in the freshmen sample (this variable was not 
administered to the upperclassmen sample). These findings align with previous research 
linking psychological reactance to resisting rules and regulations (Buboltz et al., 1999; 
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Dowd et al., 1994), nonconformity (Dowd et al., 1991; Joubert, 1990) aggressiveness, 
irritability, hostility, and defensiveness (Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993), narcissisism 
(Joubert, 1992), as well as a tendency to be uncooperative and unhelpful (Buboltz et al.).  
The hypotheses that reactance is positively associated with openness to 
experience was partially supported. There was no relationship found between these two 
variables for the freshmen sample, but a statistically significant positive relationship was 
found for the upperclassmen sample. However, the relationship between reactance and 
openness to experience was small in magnitude and was not much different than the 
correlation obtained with the freshmen sample (r = .07 vs. r =.17). Thus, previous 
research that found that those high in trait reactance are more open to new and different 
experiences than those low in trait reactance (Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993) was not 
strongly supported in the current study. One possible reason why the current study did 
not align with Dowd and Wallbrown’s findings is that different measures were 
administered across the two studies. Instead of using the HPRS, Dowd and Wallbrown 
measured trait reactance using the QMPR and TRS. In addition, they did not use the BFI 
to measure openness to experience. Rather, the Personality Research Form (PRF; 
Jackson, 1984) was administered and the Change subscale was used to measure how 
much individuals prefer new and different experiences. Furthermore, trait reactance as 
measured by the TRS had a significant positive relationship with Change (r = .13), 
whereas the QMPR had a negative relationship with Change (r = -.13). Thus, changes in 
instrumentation are likely contributing to the differences observed across studies.  
The current study also did not support the hypothesis that reactance is positively 
related to extraversion. Moreover, a significant negative association between reactance 
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and extraversion (r = -.19) was found with the upperclassmen sample. These results do 
not support previous research linking psychological reactance to traits typically 
associated with extraversion such as attention-seeking, dominance, assertiveness, and 
confidence (Buboltz et al., 1999; Dowd & Wallbrown; Dowd et al., 1994). As with 
openness to experiences, the lack of support for this hypothesis could be due to the 
different measures used across the studies. That is, Buboltz et al., Dowd and Wallbrown, 
and Dowd et al. all measured trait reactance using the QMPR and TRS, not the HPRS. In 
addition, neither of them measured extraversion directly using the BFI. Dowd and 
Wallbrown, for example, administered the PRF, which includes several subscales related 
to extraversion: dominance and exhibition (attention-seeking). A study that correlated 
each of the PRF subscales to the Big Five personality traits found that dominance and 
exhibition had low-to-moderate positive correlations with extraversion (r = .38 and .65, 
respectively; Stumpf, 1993). However, several other subscales on the PRF had moderate-
to-large positive correlations with extraversion, namely: affiliation (r = .83) and 
nurturance (r = .49). Dowd and Wallbrown found that reactance (as measured by the 
TRS) had statistically significant negative relationships with affiliation (r  = -.17) and 
nurturance (r = -.19). Thus, in previous research reactance seems to have had a positive 
relationship with the forceful aspect of extraversion, and a negative relationship with the 
sociable aspect of extraversion. Upon examination of the BFI extraversion subscale 
(which was used in the current study), most items tend to represent the sociable and 
energetic aspect of extraversion, with only one item representing the more forceful aspect 
(“I see myself as someone who has an assertive personality”). The differences in the 
measurement of both reactance and extraversion appear to account for these differences.  
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Finally, no hypothesis was made regarding the relationship between trait 
reactance and neuroticism. The two constructs were unrelated with the freshmen sample, 
but had a significant positive relationship with the upperclassmen sample. Still, the 
magnitudes of the relationships found across the two samples were not all that different (r 
= .08 vs. r =.17). Thus, the relationship between reactance and neuroticism is weak at 
best. It is possible that the differences in the relationships of reactance with openness to 
experience, extraversion, and neuroticism across the two samples were due to the fact 
that the upperclassmen are a slightly older population than then freshmen. It is also 
plausible that the slightly different factor structure championed for the two samples 
(Model 6-revised vs. Model 6) could have affected these differences. Nonetheless, the 
pattern of relationships between the external variables and reactance was quite similar 
across the two samples. 
Despite the fact that the hypotheses concerning the relationships between 
reactance and openness to experiences and extraversion were not supported, the current 
study still sheds light on the nature of these relationships. It is important to recognize that 
these hypotheses were created based on past research that used different measures of 
personality and reactance itself. Furthermore, no previous study used a bifactor model to 
isolate the general factor of reactance, controlling for sources of construct irrelevant 
variance common to measures of broad constructs such as trait reactance. In addition, 
reactance (as measured by the HPRS, TRS, or QMPR) has never been studied in relation 
to the Big Five personality traits. Therefore, the results of the current study still add to 
our understanding of the nomological network of trait reactance. The fact that the general 
reactance factor was negatively related to conformity, agreeableness, and 
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conscientiousness, and positively related to entitlement provides strong evidence that the 
HPRS does indeed measure trait reactance.  
The specific factors were also correlated with these external variables, but no 
specific hypotheses were made regarding the nature of these relationships. Given the 
extremely low construct reliabilities (Coefficient H), it is inappropriate to interpret the 
specific factors as substantively meaningful. That said, the common factor variance did 
relate to external variables, some moderate in value, highlighting the potential dangers of 
not modeling these specific factors. With the low reliability, these correlations with 
external variables may change from sample to sample. It is important to point out, 
however, that for the current study, the changing correlations between the specific factors 
is most likely due to the change in the Opposite specific factor across samples (the 
Opposite factor is represented by only items 3 and 9 for the freshmen sample, compared 
to items 3, 9, and 13 for the upperclassmen sample). The fact that Anger (the only factor 
unaffected by the Opposite specific factor) had fairly stable relationships with external 
variables across samples lends support for this argument.  That is, Anger was unaffected 
by the change in the Opposite specific factor because none its items cross-loaded on the 
Opposite specific factor. Furthermore, the relationships that changed the most were with 
the Opposite specific factor itself and the two other factors that were represented by items 
that were also representing the Opposite specific factor. 
Limitations and Future Research 
In attempt to highlight the need for future research, it is important to acknowledge 
limitations of the current study. The primary limitation of the current study was that only 
two samples of college-aged students were used to examine the structure of the HPRS. 
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Recall that Brown et al. (2009) championed a modified bifactor model. Because it is 
possible that this modified model was overfit to the idiosyncrasies of that particular 
sample, it was important to test whether these results would replicate with an independent 
sample (MacCallum et al., 1992). Although the current study did test all six hypothesized 
factor models using two independent samples, the samples are still very similar to the 
original sample used by Brown et al. Specifically, all of the participants attended the 
same public university, which is very homogeneous itself, which could limit the 
generalizability of these results to other populations. Future researchers should test the 
same six factor structures using more diverse samples. If the incomplete bifactor model 
with the Opposite specific factor fits well in other populations, then this model would be 
more plausible for use across general populations. In addition, it would be useful to 
examine the external validity of the HPRS with other populations by relating it to the 
external variables used in the current study, as well as to other theoretically-related 
variables such as trait anger. 
Alternatively, future research could focus on revising or rewriting the HPRS 
items. Although the same factor model was championed for both samples and the general 
reactance factor had adequate reliability, most items still had a large amount of 
unexplained variance. Specifically, only two items for the freshmen sample (3 and 6) and 
three items for the upperclassmen sample (3, 6, and 9) had more than 50% of their 
variance explained by the factor structure. It is possible that issues in item wording 
contributed to the observed error variance. Nearly all of the items could benefit by 
simplifying the language. For example, item 2 reads, “I find contracting others 
stimulating.” A possible way to revise this item would be to modify the wording so that it 
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reads, “I find disagreeing with others exciting.” Likewise, item 9 (“Advice and 
recommendations usually induce me to do just the opposite”) could also benefit from a 
change of wording. A possible revision could be, “Advice usually makes me feel like 
doing the opposite.” Thus, future research could focus on increasing the readability of the 
HPRS in an effort to decrease possible sources of confusion and thus, measurement error. 
Another alternative for future research would be to return to Benson’s substantive 
phase and create all new items, with more time spent linking the empirical domain (i.e., 
items) to the theoretical domain of trait reactance. As previously discussed, many issues 
associated with the HPRS seem to stem from a lack of substantive content concerning the 
dimensionality of the HPRS. The current study contributes to the substantive stage by 
providing evidence that trait reactance is a unidimensional construct. However, the HPRS 
is currently multidimensional due to construct irrelevant variance. Thus, future research 
could focus on creating a homogeneous set of items to measure trait reactance.  
On the other hand, researchers could create a unidimensional measure of trait 
reactance that covers the breadth of the construct by selecting only one item per factor of 
the HPRS to retain on the scale. However, more study of the HPRS would be required 
before deciding which items to remove.  
Conclusion 
The current study used Benson’s (1998) framework to evaluate the construct 
validity of the HPRS, and made several contributions to the understanding of the 
functioning of this scale, as well as to trait reactance in general. First, the current study 
replicated Brown et al.’s findings by championing the same model specifying an overall 
general reactance factor as well as several specific factors. This, in turn, has contributed 
97 
 
 
the theoretical conceptualization of trait reactance. As pointed out in the introduction, the 
dimensionality of trait reactance has never been explicitly theorized in the literature. 
Most researchers computed a total HPRS score, indicating that they were most interested 
in a unidimensional conceptualization of trait reactance. The current study provided 
support for this conceptualization, and helped clarify why a multidimensional solution 
emerged in previous psychometric studies of the HPRS. Specifically, because trait 
reactance is a broad construct, sources of construct irrelevant variance emerged as 
specific factors when this construct is operationalized in the form of the HPRS. Finally, 
the current study makes a third major contribution by illustrating that the general 
reactance factor correlated as expected with theoretically-related external variables. Most 
importantly, trait reactance is negatively correlated with conformity, agreeableness, and 
conscientious, and positively correlated with entitlement.  
In sum, the championed HPRS model appeared to represent the broad construct of 
trait reactance, while controlling for sources of construct-irrelevant variance. However, 
even though a unidimensional factor representing trait reactance is included in the model, 
it is important to emphasize that is not appropriate to calculate a total HPRS score as it 
would not control for the construct irrelevant variance represented by the specific factors. 
As previously demonstrated, failing to control for construct irrelevant variance, as well as 
measurement error, can lead to biased correlations with external criteria. Techniques such 
as CFA and SEM should be utilized to control for the effects of construct irrelevant 
variance and, in turn, obtain more accurate estimates of relationships between trait 
reactance and other constructs of interest. 
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Footnotes 
1
The Perceived Entitlement Scale (PES) was only administered to the freshman 
sample. 
2
Without this constraint, this part of the model would have four parameters (two 
direct loadings and two error variances) estimated from only three observations (two 
variances and one covariance); thus, this part of the model would be underidentified (df = 
-1). Adding the equality constraint of the factor loadings means that only one direct 
loading needs to be estimated, making this part of the model just-identified (df = 0). 
 
3
Given that the bifactor model specifies the existence of a general factor and as 
well as specific factors, there are several different ways to index reliability. One way to 
conceptualize reliability is as the proportion of total variance in a set of items that is 
systematic, which estimates how stable test scores are across repeated administrations 
(Revelle & Zinbarg, 2009; Sijtsma; 2009b). The proportion of systematic variance can be 
indexed by " (McDonald, 1999).  However, the most commonly reported estimate of 
reliability is Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, which is equivalent to " when the items are 
unidimensional, essentially tau-equivalent (equivalent relationships between the items 
and the factor), and have uncorrelated errors. Alpha is biased, however, when these 
assumptions are violated (which is often). For example, when items are not tau-
equivalent, alpha tends to underestimate " (Sijtsma, 2009a; Zinbarg et al., 2007). 
Conversely, alpha will overestimate " when items have correlated error terms, meaning 
that the scale is multidimensional (Bentler, 2009).  In the case of the bifactor model, the 
items are somewhat unidimensional in that they all represent a general factor, but sets of 
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items share additional variance beyond this general factor; that is, the items have 
correlated errors that can be represented by specific factors.  
It is important to note that ", like Cronbach’s alpha, estimates the proportion of 
systematic variance, regardless of its source. Systematic variance includes variance 
attributed to the general factor as well as the specific factors. This is the case even if the 
general factor is of greatest interest to the researcher and hence, the systematic variance 
due to the specific factor is unwanted.   
The proportion of variance attributed to just the general factor can be estimated 
using "H. The difference between " and "H can be summarized by the following 
statement made by Sijtsma (2009b): 
CTT ["] assesses test-score reliability as the proportion of true-score variance, without 
considering the composition of the true score. SEM reliability ["H], however, is 
concerned with the composition of the true score. SEM approaches to reliability 
decompose the true-score variance into different variance components, and the 
researcher has to decide which variance components contribute to test-score reliability 
(p. 170). 
Thus, "H will always be smaller than ", unless the scale scores are unidimensional, in 
which case the two indices will be equivalent (Zinbarg et al., 2006); if the scores are also 
tau-equivalent, then "H and " will also equal Cronbach’s alpha (Revelle & Zinbarg, 
2009). For the freshmen sample, " = .881 and "H  = .794. For the upperclassmen sample, 
" = .888 and "H  = .776. Thus, it can be derived that 8.7% (.881-.794) and 11.2% (.888-
.776) of the variance in total reactance scores is due to the construct irrelevant variance 
captured by the specific factors.  
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Whereas "H and " estimate the reliability associated with observed scores, 
Coefficient H indexes the reliability of a construct. That is, rather than estimating the 
proportion of variance in observed scores that can be explained by systematic variance 
(however, systematic variance is defined by the researcher), Coefficient H estimates the 
proportion of variance in a latent variable that can be explained by its indicators; it is 
how well a set of indicators represents or saturates a construct.  Unlike reliability 
estimates associated with composite scores (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha, "H, and "), the 
magnitude of Coefficient H is never less than the best individual item’s reliability 
(standardized $2); additional items can only increase factor reliability. Conceptually, one 
could visualize a venn diagram where trait reactance factor variance is shared with trait 
reactance item variance. Coefficient H is the aggregate of those overlapping areas 
between each item and the factor. If one conceptualizes H in this manner, as one adds 
items, shared variability will only increase. Thus, Coefficient H could be markedly 
different than "H or " because Coefficient H does not decrease due to “bad” items that 
share little variance with the construct.  
4
For the specific factors, "H is calculated using the following equation: 
! 
"H =
#i
SPECIFIC .FACTOR
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
#i
SPECIFIC .FACTOR
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
+ #i
REACTANCE
i=1
p
$
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
2
+ var(Ei)
i=1
p
$
, where where $ represents the 
unstandardized factor loadings and var(Ei) represents the error variances of each item 
that represents the particular specific factor. For the current study, for the freshmen and 
upperclassmen samples, respectively, "H was .21 and .27 for Rules and Regulations, .38 
and .37 for Anger, .38 and .19 for Opposite, and .38 and .27 for Advice.  
  
 
 
 
Table 1 
Factor Structure of the Hong Psychological Reactance Scale Across Studies 
Model Factor 1 items Factor 2 items Factor 3 items Factor 4 items 
4, 6, 8, 10 1, 2, 3 11, 12, 13, 14 5, 7, 9 
Model 1:  
Hong & Page (1989) 
Freedom of Choice Conformity Reactance Behavioral Freedom 
Reactance to Advice & 
Recommendations 
4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 3 5, 9, 10, 11 12, 13, 14 
Model 2:  
Hong (1992) 
Freedom of Choice Conformity Reactance 
Reactance to Advice & 
Recommendations 
Behavioral Freedom 
4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 3, 14 10, 11, 12, 13 5, 9 
Model 3:  
Hong & Faedda (14 
items; 1996) Emotional Response 
Toward Restricted 
Choice 
Reactance to 
Compliance 
Resisting Influence 
from Others 
Reactance toward 
Advice & 
Recommendations 
6, 7, 8 1, 2, 3 11, 12, 13 5, 9 
Model 4:  
Hong & Faedda (11 
items; 1996) Emotional Response 
Toward Restricted 
Choice 
Reactance to 
Compliance 
Resisting Influence 
from Others 
Reactance toward 
Advice & 
Recommendations 
 
1
0
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Table 2  
Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics of the HPRS for Both Samples 
               Freshmen Sample (n = 1215) 
HPRS Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
1 1.0 .434 .530 .180 .206 .275 .164 .323 .329 .295 .154 .241 .409 .363 3.02 1.05 -.132 -.445 
2 .409 1.0 .465 .224 .233 .242 .220 .278 .311 .271 .171 .229 .345 .322 2.76 1.10 .022 -.808 
3 .400 .433 1.0 .194 .300 .236 .152 .261 .458 .297 .143 .243 .444 .428 2.18 1.03 .592 -.315 
4 .297 .239 .249 1.0 .197 .412 .302 .299 .131 .252 .195 .191 .199 .179 3.38 1.10 -.311 -.563 
5 .224 .303 .350 .215 1.0 .208 .249 .137 .550 .286 .200 .320 .251 .320 2.09 0.92 .666 .089 
6 .302 .208 .209 .391 .223 1.0 .379 .545 .194 .400 .204 .256 .307 .276 3.40 1.06 -.347 -.505 
7 .182 .239 .148 .215 .251 .388 1.0 .350 .196 .273 .257 .244 .232 .206 3.50 1.07 -.481 -.384 
8 .311 .280 .225 .294 .148 .506 .377 1.0 .193 .408 .253 .275 .345 .313 3.55 0.99 -.393 -.242 
9 .293 .361 .493 .171 .525 .163 .227 .191 1.0 .410 .240 .318 .438 .402 2.08 0.91 .719 .410 
10 .328 .308 .334 .271 .332 .364 .276 .397 .409 1.0 .260 .318 .394 .396 2.73 0.99 .193 -.257 
11 .144 .146 .104 .261 .230 .278 .207 .183 .193 .285 1.0 .280 .208 .240 2.96 1.05 .098 -.554 
12 .206 .296 .282 .208 .336 .218 .319 .296 .309 .320 .343 1.0 .401 .417 2.62 1.00 .213 -.439 
13 .332 .342 .432 .271 .306 .345 .274 .373 .393 .380 .269 .396 1.0 .411 2.76 1.10 .132 -.683 
14 .365 .355 .485 .237 .335 .213 .184 .252 .419 .362 .229 .365 .448 1.0 2.37 0.99 .352 -.289 
                   
Upperclassmen Sample (n = 872) 
M 2.86 2.68 2.06 3.49 1.99 3.47 3.48 3.51 1.97 2.76 2.76 2.46 2.60 2.27     
SD 1.07 1.10 0.95 1.10 0.83 1.02 1.07 1.01 0.84 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.05 0.96     
Skewness -.08 .14 .74 -.39 .83 .50 .46 -.51 .97 .20 .24 .57 .36 .64     
Kurtosis -.70 -.87 .17 -.67 .79 -.34 -.62 -.35 1.33 -.39 -.53 -.10 -.55 .13     
Note. Correlations for the freshman sample are below the diagonal, whereas correlations for the upperclassmen sample are above the diagonal.  
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Table 3 
Fit Indices of the Tested Models  
Model !
2
SB df CFISB RMSEASB SRMR 
Sample 1: Freshmen       
Model 1: One-factor Model 1013.73 77 .89 .10 .069 
Model 2: Four-factor Model 381.49 71 .96 .06 .045 
Model 3: Second-order Model Did not converge to admissible solution 
Model 4: Bifactor Model Did not converge to admissible solution 
Model 5: Incomplete Bifactor Model 427.86 68 .96 .07 .048 
Model 6: Incomplete Bifactor Model w/Opposite Factor Did not converge to admissible solution 
Model 6-revised: Incomplete Bifactor Model w/Opposite Factor (items 3 & 9 only) 371.44 67 .96 .06 .045 
      
Sample 2: Upperclassmen       
Model 1: One-factor Model 810.96 77 .87 .10 .072 
Model 2: Four-factor Model 282.69 71 .96 .06 .046 
Model 3: Second-order Model Did not converge to admissible solution 
Model 4: Bifactor Model Did not converge to admissible solution 
Model 5: Incomplete Bifactor Model 245.35 68 .97 .05 .043 
Model 6: Incomplete Bifactor Model w/Opposite Factor 200.78 65 .98 .05 .039 
      
1
0
3
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Unstandardized Factor Pattern Coefficients (Completely Standardized Coefficients), and 
Unstandardized Error Variances for Incomplete Bifactor Model with Opposite Specific Factor 
Sample 1: Freshmen  
Item Reactance Anger Rules Advice Opposite Error Variances 
1 .52* (.49)  .35* (.33)   .72 
2 .57* (.52)  .38* (.34)   .74 
3 .57* (.56)  .45* (.44)  .35* (.35) .40 
4 .45* (.41) .30* (.27)    .91 
5 .48* (.52)   .42* (.45)  .45 
6 .49* (.46) .72* (.68)    .37 
7 .45* (.42) .32* (.30)    .84 
8 .49* (.50) .41* (.42)    .24 
9 .53* (.59)   .42* (.46) .35* (.39) .42 
10 .62* (.63)     .59 
11 .44* (.42)     .91 
12 .58* (.57)     .67 
13 .74* (.67)     .65 
14 .60* (.61)  .24* (.24)   .56 
       
Sample 2: Upperclassmen  
Item Reactance Anger Rules Advice Opposite Error Variances 
       
1 .55* (.51)  .49* (.45)   .61 
2 .52* (.48)  .42* (.39)   .75 
3 .48* (.51)  .53* (.57)  .33* (.35) .26 
4 .38* (.34) .40* (.36)    .91 
5 .38* (.46)   .44* (.53)  .35 
6 .49* (.49) .67* (.66)    .33 
7 .43* (.40) .32* (.30)    .85 
8 .53* (.52) .43* (.43)    .55 
9 .48* (.57)   .44* (.53) .29* (.35) .19 
10 .63* (.64)     .57 
11 .40* (.41)     .82 
12 .57* (.58)     .66 
13 .68* (.65)    .29* (.24) .58 
14 .61* (.63)  .13* (.13)   .54 
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Table 5 
Factor Correlations between HPRS Factors and the External Variables 
HPRS 
Factors 
Conformity Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness Entitlement 
Sample 1: Freshmen      
Reactance -.46* -.06 -.43* -.25* .08 .07 .25* 
Anger -.08 .14 .07 .15 .02 .21 -.14 
Rules -.45* .08 -.33* -.29* -.15 .10 .03 
Advice -.03 -.16 -.37* -.06 .18* .13 .10 
Opposite -.32* .13 .08 -.19* -.08 -.22* -.09 
        
Sample 2: Upperclassmen      
Reactance -.46* -.19* -.37* -.29* .17* .17* - 
Anger .03 .19* .01 .17* -.04 .29* - 
Rules -.41* .25* -.45* -.33* .01 .11 - 
Advice -.04 -.10 -.40* -.07 .15* -.14 - 
Opposite -.08 .08 .31* -.08 -.08 -.03 - 
1
0
5
 
  
 
Table 6 
Effects of Not Taking Measurement Error or Construct Irrelevant Variance into account when Estimating Correlations among 
Variables 
  
Method of Computing Correlations 
 
External Variable 
Method I: 
Observed Scores 
Method II: 
Latent Unidimensional Factors 
Method III: 
Bifactor Model (HPRS) and  
Latent Unidimensional Factors  
(External Variables) 
Sample 1: Freshmen     
Conformity -.43 -.57 -.46 
Extraversion .01 -.03 -.06 
Agreeableness -.39 -.51 -.43 
Conscientiousness -.22 -.31 -.25 
Neuroticism .05 .06 .08 
Openness .08 .07 .07 
Entitlement .19 .23 .25 
    
Sample 2: Upperclassmen     
Conformity -.42 -.55 -.46 
Extraversion -.08 -.09 -.19 
Agreeableness -.36 -.47 -.37 
Conscientiousness -.25 -.35 -.29 
Neuroticism .14 .17 .17 
Openness .17 .21 .17 
1
0
6
 
  
 
 
Figure 1. Brown et al.’s (2009) a priori models 
      
  
Note. Emotional Response Toward Restricted Choice is ERTC, Reactance Toward Compliance is RTC, Resising Influence from Others is 
RIO, and Reactance Toward Advice and Recommendations is RAR. In Model 4, the unstandardized path coefficients of items 5 and 9 on 
the the Advice specific factor are constrained to be equal as it is only represented by two indicators (items 5 and 9) and thus, would not be 
identified.  
 
Model 1: One-Factor Model Model 2: Four-Factor Model 
Model 3: Second-Order Model Model 4: Bifactor Model 
1
0
7
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Figure 2. Brown et al.’s (2009) ancillary models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. As in the original bifactor model, the unstandardized path coefficients of items 5 and 9 on the the 
Advice specific factor are constrained to be equal as it is only represented by two indicators (items 5 and 9) 
and thus, would not be identified in this model without this constraint.  
 
Model 5: Incomplete Bifactor Model 
Model 6: Incomplete Bifactor Model with Opposite Specific Factor  
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Figure 3. Interaction between force of threat and importance of threat on the experience 
of reactance. 
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Figure 4. Influence of the interaction between force of threat and importance of threat on 
resultant tendency (conformity or non-conformity). 
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Figure 5. Dillard and Shen’s (2005) intertwined process cognitive-affective model  
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Figure 6. Single indicator model for evaluating factor correlations with external variables 
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Appendix A 
Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale 
The following statements concern your general attitudes.  Read each statement and please 
indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.  If you strongly agree 
mark a 5.  If  you strongly disagree, mark a 1.  If the statement is more or less true of 
you, find the number between 5 and 1 that best describes you.  Realize that students do 
not feel the same nor are they expected to feel the same. Simply answer how you feel.  
There are no right or wrong answers.  Just answer as accurately as possible.  
 
 
Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me. 
2. I find contradicting others stimulating. 
3. When something is prohibited, I usually think, “That’s exactly what I am going to do”. 
4. The thought of being dependent on others aggravates me. 
5. I consider advice from others to be an intrusion. 
6. I become frustrated when I am unable to make free and independent decisions. 
7. It irritates me when someone points out things which are obvious to me. 
8. I become angry when my freedom of choice is restricted. 
9. Advice and recommendations usually induce me to do just the opposite. 
10. I am content only when I am acting of my own free will. 
11. I resist the attempts of others to influence me. 
12. It makes me angry when another person is held up as a role model for me to follow. 
13. When someone forces me to do something, I feel like doing the opposite. 
14. It disappoints me to see others submitting to standards and rules.  
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire for the Measurement of Psychological Reactance 
1. Regulations and duties trigger a sense of resistance in me. 
A
 
I react strongly to duties and regulations.
B
  
2. It stimulates me to contradict others. 
I get a “kick” out of contradicting others. 
3. In my behavior, I rarely consider the thoughts of others. 
I seldom behave according to others’ standards. 
4. When something is prohibited, I react against it by thinking: “That’s exactly what I am going to do.” 
When I am told not to do something, my reaction is “Now I’ll do it for sure.” 
5. The thought of being dependent on others is unpleasant to me. 
The thought of being dependent on others is very unpleasant to me. 
6. I consider advice from others to be patronizing. 
When I get advice, I take it more as a demand. 
7. Making free and independent decisions is more important to me than it is for most people. 
To make free and independent decisions is more important to me than to most people. 
8. It makes me angry when someone points out things which are obvious to me. 
It makes me angry when someone points out something that I already know. 
9. I often do not feel like doing something simply because others expect me to. 
Often I lose enthusiasm for doing something just because others expect me to do it. 
10. I react strongly when someone tries to restrict my personal freedom of choice. 
I get very irritated when someone tries to interfere with my freedom to make decisions. 
11. Advice and recommendations easily induce me to do just the opposite.  
Suggestions and advice often make me do the opposite. 
12. Only those things which I do out of free will really agree with me. 
I only succeed in doing things well if I do them. 
13. I resist the attempts of others to influence me. 
I strongly resist people’s attempts to influence me. 
14. It makes me angry when another person is presented as a role model.  
I get annoyed when someone else is put up as an example for me. 
15. When someone forces me to do something, I say to myself: “Now that’s exactly what I don’t want to 
do.” 
When I am pushed to do something, I often tell myself, “For sure, I won’t do it.” 
16. It pleases me to see how others submit to social norms and constraints (R) 
It pleases me when I see how others disobey social norms and obligations. 
17. Strong praise makes me skeptical. 
Excessive praise makes me suspicious.  
18. I react negatively when someone tries to tell me what I should or should not do. 
I get very irritated when somebody tells me what I must or must not do. 
  
A
Tucker & Byer’s (1989) English translation on first line. 
B
Donnell et al’s (2001) English translation on second line. 
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Appendix C 
Therapeutic Reactance Scale 
1. If I receive a lukewarm dish at a restaurant, I make an attempt to let that be known. 
2. I resent authority figures who tell me what to do. 
3. I find that I often have to question authority. 
4. I enjoy seeing someone else do something that neither of us is supposed to do. 
5. I have a strong desire to maintain my personal freedom. 
6. I enjoy seeing play “devil’s advocate” whenever I can. 
7. In discussions, I am easily persuaded by others (R) 
8. Nothing turns me on as much as a good argument! 
9. It would be better to have more freedom to do what I want on a job. 
10. If I am told what to do, I often do the opposite. 
11. I am sometimes afraid to disagree with others. (R) 
12. It really bothers me when police officers tell me what to do.  
13. It does not upset me to change my plans because someone in the group wants to do something 
else. (R) 
14. I don’t mind other people telling me what to do. (R) 
15. I enjoy debates with other people. 
16. If someone asks a favor of me, I will think twice about what this person is really after. 
17. I am not very tolerant of others’ attempts to persuade me. 
18. I often follow the suggestions of others. (R)  
19. I am relatively opinionated. 
20. It is important to me to be in a powerful position relative to others. 
21. I am very open to solutions to my problems from others. (R) 
22. I enjoy “showing up” people who think they are right. 
23. I consider myself more competitive than cooperative. 
24. I don’t mind doing something for someone even when I don’t know why I’m doing it. (R) 
25. I usually go along with others’ advice. (R) 
26. I feel it is better to stand up for what I believe than to be silent. 
27. I am very stubborn and set in my ways. 
28. It is very important to me to get along with the people I work with. (R) 
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Appendix D 
General Conformity Scale 
The following statements concern your attitudes or behaviors.  Not all students feel or behave the 
same nor are they expected to feel or behave the same. Simply answer how you feel or behave.  
There are no right or wrong answers.  Just answer as accurately as possible. Item responses 
are aggregated across all student respondents in order to better understand the “average” JMU 
student.   
Read each statement and please indicate how true each statement is of you.  If you think the 
statement is very true of you, mark a 7.  If a statement is not at all true of you, mark a 1.  If the 
statement is more or less true of you, find the number between 7 and 1 that best describes you.   
 
          1                  2                  3                  4                  5                   6                   7 
Not at all                                                                                                           Very true 
true of me                                                                                                          of me     
 
1. If a teacher asks me to do something, I usually do it. 
2. I usually do what I am told.  
3.  I usually obey my parents.  
4. I follow my parents’ wishes even when it means not doing something I want to do. 
5. Even when I disagree with my parents’ wishes, I usually do what I am told. 
6. I break rules frequently. R 
7. I rarely follow the rules. R 
 
Note: R indicates that the item needs to be reversed scored. 
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Appendix E 
Big Five Inventory 
Below are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree that 
you are someone who “likes to spend time with others”? Please bubble in the number from 1 to 5 that 
indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. Please take your time and answer 
thoughtfully. 
I See Myself as Someone Who... 
1. Is talkative     23. Tends to be lazy 
2. Tends to find fault with others    24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
3. Does a thorough job    25. Is inventive 
4. Is depressed, blue     26. Has an assertive personality 
5. Is original, comes up with new ideas   27. Can be cold and aloof 
6. Is reserved      28. Perseveres until the task is finished 
7. Is helpful and unselfish with others   29. Can be moody 
8. Can be somewhat careless    30. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
9. Is relaxed, handles stress well    31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
10. Is curious about many different things   32. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
11. Is full of energy     33. Does things efficiently 
12. Starts quarrels with others    34. Remains calm in tense situations 
13. Is a reliable worker     35. Prefers work that is routine 
14. Can be tense      36. Is outgoing, sociable 
15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker    37. Is sometimes rude to others 
16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm    38. Makes plans and follows through with them 
17. Has a forgiving nature    39. Gets nervous easily 
18. Tends to be disorganized    40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
19. Worries a lot      41. Has few artistic interests 
20. Has an active imagination    42. Likes to cooperate with others 
21. Tends to be quiet     43. Is easily distracted 
22. Is generally trusting     44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature      
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Appendix F 
Perceived Entitlement Scale 
Please respond to the following items using the number that best reflects your own 
beliefs. There are no right or wrong answers. Just answer as honestly as possible.  
Notice the change in response scale below (1= Strong Disagreement, 7=Strong 
Agreement). 
    1 = strong disagreement 
    2 = moderate disagreement 
3 = slight disagreement 
4 = neither agreement nor disagreement 
5 = slight agreement 
6 = moderate agreement 
7 = strong agreement 
 
1. I honestly feel I’m just more deserving than others. 
2. Great things should come to me. 
3. If I were on the Titanic, I would deserve to be on the first lifeboat! 
4. I demand the best because I’m worth it. 
5. I do not necessarily deserve special treatment. R 
6. I deserve more things in my life. 
7. People like me deserve an extra break now and then. 
8. Things should go my way. 
9. I feel entitled to more of everything. 
 
Note: R indicates that the item needs to be reversed scored. 
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